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THE URBANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE RISING SOFT POWER OF CITIES IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Chrystie Swiney ∗

I. Introduction
In an era of increased partisan gridlock among nation-states, ongoing
democratic deficits in the international policymaking process, plummeting
levels of trust in national leaders, and the failure of federal governments to
1
solve our most pressing global problems, attention is shifting to a different
2
set of actors: cities. Cities are not only more attuned to the needs of their
electorate, more trusted than their national counterparts, more adept at getting things done, and less partisan when it comes to working across aisles
3
and oceans, but they are also more ambitious in pushing forward bold, hu*
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1.
See THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD, & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL
COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) (arguing that our tools for global
policymaking, primarily state-to-state negotiations over treaties and international institutions,
have broken down); Dan Koon-Hong Chan, City Diplomacy and “Glocal” Governance: Revitalizing Cosmopolitan Democracy, 29 EURO. J. SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 135 (2016) (discussing
how international policymaking suffers from democratic deficits).
2.
Many pundits, scholars, and even former diplomats are starting to make this argument. See, e.g., GERALD FRUG, RICHARD FORD, & DAVID BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 278 (6th ed. 2010); Nina Hachigian, Cities Will Determine the
Future of Diplomacy, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 16, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/16/
cities-will-determine-the-future-of-diplomacy; Chrystie Swiney & Sheila Foster, Cities are
Rising in Influence and Power on the Global Stage, CITYLAB (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2019/04/city-leadership-international-policy-mayorsu20-uclg-c40/587089; Robert Muggah et al., Cities, Not Nation States, Will Determine Our
Future Survival. Here’s Why, WORLD ECON. F. (June 2, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2017/06/as-nation-states-falter-cities-are-stepping-up.
3.
Richard Florida, Are Local Politics as Polarized as National? Depends on the Issue, CITYLAB (Apr. 24, 2019) https://www.citylab.com/life/2019/04/polarization-cities227
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manity-saving agendas. As national governments seem increasingly unable
or unwilling to advance progressive policies at the international level, and as
our shared global challenges grow more and more urgent––climate change,
deepening inequality, the global migration crisis, shortages of affordable
housing, infectious pandemics, democratic decay, and rising extremism––
4
cities are rising up and moving ahead with or without their national coun5
terparts. In so doing, cities are gaining influence and assertiveness not only
at the national level, but within international politics as well, and this reality
is decisively shifting our traditional understandings of both international law
6
and global politics.
Cities are entirely absent from the increasingly anachronistic interna7
tional political and legal framework forged after World War II. Consequently, they have been forced to work within a system that largely denies
their independent existence, or, more precisely, views them as subordinate
8
appendages of their nation-states. States, not cities, are expected to represent their citizens and all sub-national entities at the international level: National governments, not local ones, send representatives to staff the governing bodies comprising the United Nations (“UN”) and other international
organizations, and states, not cities, are tasked with drafting, codifying, and
enforcing international treaties and agreements on behalf of their sub9
national entities. Formally and institutionally, cities have no voice, no offieducation-labor-public-opinion-taxes/587746 (discussing a recent study that found that, in the
United States, trust in national government is around 17%, while trust in local institutions is
over 70%).
4.
In this article, I use the word “city” to mean “local governments,” and I use the two
terms interchangeably. But cities are of course so much more than just their local governments. They are composed of people, civil society organizations, private corporations,
schools, and government officials, among others.
5.
Barbara Oomen & Moritz Baumgärtel, Frontier Cities: The Rise of Local Authorities as an Opportunity for International Human Rights Law, 29 EURO. J. INT’L L. 607, 608
(2018) (arguing that local actors increasingly claim and obtain a key role in the realization of
international law).
6.
This phenomenon (cities rising up to act as independent actors) is very much happening at the national level as well: Cities are rising up within national politics to assert their
own positions and opinions, and they are finding ways to enact their own progressive policies
even in the face of national opposition. But the focus of this paper will be on cities’ role in the
international sphere only, specifically through the lens of international relations and international law. I hope to write about the rising role of cities at the national level in a future publication.
7.
Cities are not at all absent or missing from national laws (indeed these laws typically specify what roles and rights they have), but they are entirely missing from formal public
international law. (Private international law, in contrast, does take cities more seriously. This
article, however, focuses only on public international law.)
8.
Use of the word “state” in this article refers to nation-states; it does not refer to a
federal state in a federated system, such as the United States, unless so designated (as by “U.S.
state”).
9.
The United Nations (“UN”) Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945, outlines
the basic rules that shape the current international political and legal framework. A cursory
review of its nineteen chapters reveals how myopically focused this framework is on nation-
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cial seat or platform––indeed, no meaningful existence––within the current
international policymaking system.
Yet, despite the many institutional, legal, and political barriers that exist
to prevent cities from entering the international political arena, they are nevertheless finding ways to do so, and with increasing success. More specifically, cities are discovering ways to act as autonomous, independent actors
10
in their own right––separate and independent of their federal counterparts –
–in their efforts to influence and shape international agendas. This article
explores the variety of creative and resourceful strategies that they have
honed to do so, largely over the past two decades. These include: (1) coalescing together to form large networks, which engage in city or “glocal”
11
diplomacy; (2) allying with well-connected and well-resourced interna12
13
tional organizations; (3) gaining inclusion in UN multilateral agendas;
14
(4) mirroring state-based coalitions and their high-profile events; (5) harstates. Indeed, cities are not mentioned a single time, while the words “nation” and “state”
appear over forty times. See Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute].
10.
Concurrently, some cities are working alongside their federal counterparts––
through formal offices or collaborations created by the national government––to participate in
policy at the international level. For example, in the United States, from 2010 to 2013 the
Obama administration created a special representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs,
which was charged with building strategic peer-to-peer relationships between the U.S. Department of State, U.S. state and local officials, and their foreign counterparts. See Reta Jo
Lewis, Staff Profile, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES [THE GERMAN
MARSHALL FUND], http://www.gmfus.org/profiles/reta-jo-lewis-esq (last visited Nov. 24,
2019). There is currently a bipartisan bill under consideration, the City and State Diplomacy
Act (H.R. 3571, 116th Cong. (2019)), which would establish a permanent Office of Subnational Diplomacy within the Department of State to encourage state- and city-level international diplomacy. The bill remains under review and has not yet become law. See Reta Jo
Lewis, A New Act to Revitalize U.S. Diplomacy from the Ground Up, THE GERMAN
MARSHALL FUND (July 22, 2019), www.gmfus.org/blog/2019/07/22/new-act-revitalize-usdiplomacy-ground.
11.
“Glocal” diplomacy, as used in this article and as further described and defined below, is the unmediated diplomatic action of local governments at the international level. The
term was popularized by sociologist Roland Robertson in the 1990s to explain how global
social processes are selectively redefined and adapted to suit local cultural exigencies. Margaret Rouse, Glocalization Definition, TECHTARGET, https://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/
glocalization (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
12.
Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 552–63 (2009).
13.
Examples include: The New Urban Agenda; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see Goal 11 specifically); the Paris Climate Agreement; the Addis Ababa Action
Agenda; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and the UN Conference on the
Environment and Development. Many of these examples are discussed infra in Part III.C.
14.
One example includes the U20, or the Urban 20, which seeks to coordinate joint
policy positions between the mayors of the main cities of the G20 and those of other global
urban centers in order to inform and enrich the discussions had by national leaders during
their G20 Summits. It meets on the sidelines of G20 events. See UNITED CITIES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS [UCLG], U20: 25 Cities Commit to Work with the G20 in Response to Major
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nessing the language of international law (especially international human
rights and environmental law) to advance agendas at odds with their nation15
al counterparts; and (6) adopting resolutions, declarations, and voluntarily
self-policed commitments––what I refer to as global law––that look strik16
ingly similar to state-made international law. Using these six strategies,
cities are piercing the states-only veil of international politics in ways argu17
ably not seen in the post-Westphalian era.
To be sure, cities are not the only “new” non-state actors to get involved
18
in the state-centric world of international politics. By jumping into the international political fray, cities are joining a chorus of other non-state actors,
including civil society organizations, private corporations, regional coalitions, special interest groups, and a ream of others in what has become an
19
increasingly diffuse international political arena. However, unlike most of
these other non-state actors, cities carry a unique status: They are still governmental.

Global
Challenges,
https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/25-cities-commit-work-g20response-major-global-challenges (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
15.
See generally GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES 275
(Barbara Oomen, Martha Davis, & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016).
16.
Each of these will be discussed below. I chose the term “global law” to serve as a
juxtaposition to Gerald Frug and David Barron’s term international local law, which is further
discussed and detailed in the sections below. See Gerald Frug & David Barron, International
Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1, 59 (2006).
17.
Before the Westphalian era, cities played a powerful role at the international level.
Well-documented examples of politically autonomous cities include ancient Greek city-states,
cities in ancient Mesopotamia, and cities in the Hanseatic League of Cities, which existed
th
th
from the 14 to the 17 centuries. The Bible is also replete with examples of powerful cities in
ancient and early CE times: Jericho, Ur, Babylon, Damascus, Jerusalem, etc. But from the
Peace of Westaphalia in 1648 onwards, the nation-state became the center of international
politics, law and relations. See generally INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES
AND ISSUES (Rumki Basu ed., 2012); PAUL D’ANIERI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER
AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS (4th ed. 2016); KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND
WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (reprt. 2001) (1954).
18.
I put “new” in quotes because there is a long history of non-state actors attempting
to penetrate and shape the international legal and political sphere. For example, humanitarian
activists and organizations, such as the Red Cross (which is 137 years old), have actively
shaped international humanitarian law and the laws of war for hundreds of years. RED CROSS,
A Brief History of the Red Cross, https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/
National/history-full-history.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
19.
Many political scientists and legal scholars talk about, and research, the fragmented
nature of global politics in the twenty-first century. Anne-Marie Slaughter was one of the first
to make a persuasive and formidable argument about this. Though she did not specifically
feature or focus on cities––she focused instead on transnational networks––she is nevertheless
one of the leading scholars to have pointed out the diffusing nature of global power and politics. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 284 (2004).
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Moreover, at least for those city governments operating within one of
20
the world’s 115 electoral democracies, they are representative, rather than
21
issue-, interest-, or profit-driven. Cities are where human populations are
converging; over half of all people live in urban centers today, a number
22
that will rise to two-thirds by 2050. Roughly every two weeks, a population the size of Chicago joins the world’s urban population, which already
includes over 500 cities worldwide with populations of more than one mil23
lion residents. Thus, cities, unlike many of the other non-state actors involved in global politics, have a uniquely compelling argument regarding
their legitimacy and right to be involved in shaping global agendas: They
represent the interests of actual people––a lot of actual people, indeed most
of the world’s people––not just elite or special interest-driven missions,
24
however noble those missions might be. As legal scholars Barbara Oomen
and Moritz Baumgärtel put it, cities represent a “transnational force beyond
the top down world of international negotiations or the bottom-up advocacy
25
of civil society groups.” They are uniquely placed and have a uniquely
strong claim on the legitimacy of their participation in the hypercompetitive world of global policy making and shaping.
This article examines the various ways in which cities are “leapfrogging” over their nation-states to act as autonomous actors in their own right
at the international level, as well as the implications of this newfound development on both international law (“IL”) and international relations

20.
According to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World Report, which
measures the state of freedom in the world by quantifying the level of civil and political rights
in every country, there are currently 115 electoral democracies in the world. See FREEDOM
HOUSE, List of Electoral Democracies (from the Freedom in the World 2020 Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). This number varies from year to year and is slightly lower than the number of electoral democracies from previous years; for example, there were the 123 countries designated as electoral democracies in
Freedom House’s 2017 report, and 116 in its 2019 report. Even with the variance, it appears
that the percentage of the world’s governments that are electoral democracies is at or above
60%.
21.
See BENJAMIN BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL
NATIONS, RISING CITIES 336–61 (2013).
22.
U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision, at 11, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/420 (2019). These numbers are shocking when considering that in 1950, only 30% of the world’s population was urban. Id.
23.
Ivo Daalder, Why Cities Need Their Own Foreign Policies, POLITICO (June 6,
2017).
24.
HABITAT III: U.N. CONF. ON HOUSING AND SUSTAINABLE URB. DEV. [hereinafter
HABITAT III], Global
Taskforce
of
Local
and
Regional
Governments,
http://habitat3.org/engagement/global-taskforce-of-local-and-regional-governments (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). The Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments is very active at
the UN level. It routinely argues that “[l]ocal governments have unique legitimacy, as a democratically elected sphere of the state, to bring together and balance all sectors and interests in
their communities.” Id.
25.
Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 610.
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26

(“IR”). To understand why cities are adopting particular tools and strategies, one must first comprehend their formal place within the existing international and political legal framework, as well as the factors driving cities to
assert themselves at the international level in the first place. As such, Part II
examines the virtual absence of cities from the existing international legal
framework, which was put in place in the 1940s, but whose conceptual origins date back to the mid-seventeenth century. This section outlines the traditional black letter law pertaining to cities and their involvement in global
politics and law and examines a niche body of scholarship known as “international local government law,” that until now has largely framed the scholarly discussion on cities’ relationship to IL. This literature, which was
spearheaded by Professors Yishai Blank, David Barron, and Gerald Frug in
27
2006, is both outdated and subject to (long-overdue) criticism.
Part III then examines the various tools and strategies being used by cities and their networks to penetrate the state-centric international system and
to become influential and independent international actors in their own
right. As previously stated, these strategies include: forming into networks,
allying with international organizations, locating seats on UN decisionmaking bodies and inclusion in multilateral agendas, mirroring state-based
coalitions and high-profile events, harnessing the language of international
law, and adopting what I refer to as global law in order to hold each other to
account. Global law is primarily composed of voluntary, self-enforced
commitments that are drafted, implemented, and enforced by global, nonstate actors––notably including cities––but that are arguably no less “real”
than much of what qualifies as state-made international law.
Particular attention will be devoted to international city networks, arguably the most robust and influential of these strategies. The existing scholarship on city networks, much of which is spearheaded by IR scholar Michele
28
Acuto but expounded on by others, will be reviewed and critiqued. While
this literature offers many insights and useful empirical data, it almost entirely ignores cities’ formal powerlessness under IL and, in general, lacks in
legal analysis, which is crucial for fully understanding the role of cities at
the international level.
Part IV of this paper advances a new way of conceptualizing the current
status of cities within international politics and under IL by drawing on two
concepts in particular: “soft power,” which comes from IR theory, and “soft
law,” which is discussed primarily in international legal scholarship. By applying these two concepts to cities––and by building upon the insights
gleaned from the relevant bodies of literature associated with cities and city
26.
See Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 886
(2006) (referring to cities “leapfrogging” over their federal governments to act of their own
accord).
27.
Id.; FRUG, FORD, & BARRON, supra note 2.
28.
See generally Octavi de la Varga Mas, Entangled: A Reflection on the Current
State of the Ecosystem of Local Government Networks, in RETHINKING THE ECOSYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL CITY NETWORKS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 85, 85 (2019).
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diplomacy, I tentatively offer a new framework and a new vocabulary for
understanding cities’ radically changing role in global politics, which I refer
to as “the Urbanization of Global Relations.”
Finally, Part V discusses predicted trends in urban-global, or “glocal,”
politics and what they say about our changing international legal and political world order (what I would simply refer to as the “global” world order).
The term “international” no longer seems appropriate to describe a sphere
where the state is now only one of a multitude of influential actors. The article concludes with a call for help advancing and refining the research agenda proposed herein and with suggestions for areas ripe for further exploration at the intersection of IL, IR, and urban studies. Only by reaching across
our ivory towers and siloed departments, cross-pollinating our ideas, and
working collaboratively together can we hope to fully grasp the complex
political landscape that now defines global governance.

II. Cities and International Law
A. Black Letter International Law on Cities
Traditional black letter international law, which is designed to deal with
29
state behavior with very few exceptions, is effectively blind to the existence of cities. Indeed, reference to “cities” is entirely absent from the tradi30
31
tional sources of IL: Cities cannot form treaties or contribute to the for32
mation of customary IL, they cannot obtain legal standing in international
33
courts or tribunals, and they are not mentioned a single time anywhere in
the UN Charter, a foundational international legal framework that mentions
34
“state” and “nation” over forty times.
29.
The exceptions primarily include international human rights law and international
criminal law, both of which deal with the actions or treatment of individuals. See Chan, supra
note 1, at 135.
30.
See U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 38(1) (defining traditional
sources of international law as treaties, custom, general principles of law, the decisions of
lower courts, and scholarly writings).
31.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (defining a treaty as an “international agreement concluded between
States”).
32.
See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Customary International Law, 16
MICH. J. INT’L L. 667, 670 (1995) (stating that customary international law is determined by
examining state practice and opinio juris).
33.
Though cities are often party to domestic lawsuits and though they may have recourse in international matters through private international law, the mandates of the largest
international public law tribunals give standing only to states. See, e.g., U.N. Charter and ICJ
Statute, supra note 9, art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the court.”);
Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, arts. 11–13 (referring
only to jurisdiction over State Parties).
34.
See U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute, supra note 9. Note that the Preamble to the UN
Charter does mention that the representative governments drafting the Charter met in the
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Under IL, cities entirely lack legal personality, which means they do not
35
have rights, duties, or recognition under the law. Moreover, given that cities are not subjects of IL, they cannot be held liable for international legal
36
violations, nor can they be full, independent members of state-based international organizations, including the UN (or any of its primary organs),
37
whose exclusive membership includes only “peace loving states.”
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the key international
instrument governing the creation and enforcement of international treaties
(the primary source of IL), explicitly defines treaties as international agree38
ments formed between states. The Convention makes no mention whatsoever of any other jurisdiction bearing this critical law-making authority; it
39
applies to states (and organizations composed of states) alone. Likewise, a
leading IL textbook spans nearly 1700 pages of detailed text, yet there is not
40
a single section or sub-section on cities or local governments, an omission
also reflected in the syllabi for IL courses found in a non-exhaustive, but ex41
tensive, online search. This myopic fixation on states is built into the core
“City” of San Francisco. This is not a substantive inclusion of the word “city,” so I did not
count it. Id. pmbl.
35.
RICHARD PUGH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 248 (4th
ed. 2001); Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 892.
36.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
207(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law resulting from action or inaction by . . . (b) the government or authorities
of any political subdivision of the state.”); G.A. Res 56/83, ¶ 4(1) Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, (Jan. 28, 2002), (“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State international law . . . whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.”).
37.
U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute, supra note 8, art. 4(1); see also UNITED NATIONS,
About UN Membership, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un-membership/
index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (describing how states can be admitted to membership); UNITED NATIONS, About Permanent Observers, https://www.un.org/en/sections/
member-states/about-permanent-observers/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (noting that
both “non-member states” such as the Holy See and Palestine, and regional and international
civil society organizations can serve as observers at the UN General Assembly and before one
or more specialized UN agency); UNITED NATIONS, Permanent Observers: Intergovernmental
and Other Organizations, https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/intergovernmentaland-other-organizations/index.html (listing organizations invited to attend UN General Assembly meetings).
38.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 2(1)(a).
39.
Id. art. 1 (“The present Convention applies to treaties between States.”); see also id.
art. 7 (affirming that representatives of states belonging to international organizations can also
conclude treaties). This is an application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon. By
including organizations of states, convention participants showed they considered (or had the
opportunity to consider) other viable non-state actors and rejected them.
40.
PUGH ET AL., supra note 35. Note that while there is a lengthy section on “municipal law,” “municipal” in the international law context refers to domestic, national-level law,
not local or city-level law. Id.
41.
Needless to say, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of international law courses
nation-wide and globally, each of which is accompanied by a syllabus. I reviewed roughly
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vocabulary associated with the international political and legal world order–
–the United Nations (the successor to the League of Nations), international
law, international organizations, international relations, international diplomacy––making it difficult to even talk about global politics without employing the word “nation.”
The foundational principle of IL, which can be traced back over 300
years, is built on the long-standing idea that nation-states are the highest and
42
exclusive authority, the Leviathan, over their territories. With rare exception, IL treats states as the makers and shapers of its content and as the gate43
keepers of implementation and enforcement. As political scientist James
Rosenau and others have argued, the state centrism of IR and IL is a “conceptual jail” that prevents us from noticing the rise of other non-state actors
44
in international affairs and the blurring of the historical lines between the
45
local and the global, the domestic and the foreign.
Nation-states are understandably protective of their pinnacle position in
the international legal and political pecking order. While cities can and do
violate international law, when they do, the cities’ states are held responsible for their violations, not the cities themselves. By passing legislation that
codifies international legal norms into domestic law, states can hold their
cities directly responsible for violations domestically, but the connection between IL and cities is never direct. At least formally, this connection is always meditated by the state.

B. Revisiting International Local Government Law
Scholars of local government law began noticing a direct connection, or
what they thought was a direct connection, between the law of local governance and IL in the earlier part of this century. In particular, a series of articles published in 2006 by three scholars of local government law began detailing the evolving relationship between these two previously unconnected
46
fields.
Blank broke new ground when he argued that cities had become “objects of global, international, and transnational regulation,” something that
fifty syllabi that I located through a simple online search. This is admittedly an anecdotal approach, but it is nevertheless reflective, in my opinion, of the lack of focus on cities in international law courses.
42.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL (1886).
43.
Implementation and enforcement tasks are arguably shifting to allow for other actors to be involved. See generally Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 626.
44.
See Chan, supra note 1, at 138 (citing JAMES ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTICFOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD 15–17 (1997)).
45.
See JAMES ROSENAU, DISTANT PROXIMITIES: DYNAMICS BEYOND
GLOBALIZATION 410 (2003) (“What is domestic is also foreign and what is foreign is also
domestic.”).
46.
See generally Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26; Frug & Barron, supra
note 16.
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47

had, until then, received “virtually no discussion.” Though conceding that
cities still fall “short of obtaining the status of full international legal entities,” Blank nevertheless argued that cities have become relevant to the
48
making, shaping, and enforcing of international law. Because of this, he
asserted, cities are moving ever closer to being actual “bearers” and “ob49
jects” of international rights, duties, and powers. Blank made two other
bold claims. First, that cities have become enforcers of international norms
and standards, often referred to as “soft law” (though Blank never used this
50
term). Second, that in so doing, cities have gained influence as political
actors, in their own right, on the world political stage (what I argue is “soft
51
power,” though again, Blank never used this term). These developments
are part of a new “emerging global legal order,” Blank claimed; like the new
political world order, he argued that it has become more fragmented and
dispersed and involves a multitude of new non-state actors that now partici52
pate alongside states in global governance. According to Blank, cities are
“the most prominent” among these new actors and in the “reconfiguration of
53
the global order.” The nation-state no longer stands as the unitary and im54
penetrable billiard ball it once was. It is now accompanied, and at times
challenged, by a multitude of other actors, notably including increasingly
55
vocal, organized, and ambitious local governments.
Traditionally, most political––and virtually all legal––theories have focused primarily on two dyadic relationships: the global-national relationship
and the national-local one. To these two dyads, Professor Blank usefully
56
added a third: the global-local relationship. According to Blank, this new
dyad has been forged largely because local governments have learned to use
IL to their advantage, to “leapfrog” over their state governments and to have
a direct and autonomous connection with international organizations and
57
agendas. Blank’s insight that there could be a direct connection between
the local and the global, a connection unmediated by the state, was novel at

47.
Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 899–90.
48.
Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263,
266 (2006).
49.
Id. at 266.
50.
Id. at 268.
51.
Id. at 281 (claiming that “[l]ocalities are no longer mere bureaucratic subdivisions
of states”. . . but instead are “increasingly influential” in “the global legal order”).
52.
See Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 924.
53.
Id. at 886.
54.
ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 19–20 (1962).
55.
Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 930.
56.
Id. at 889. Collectively, he refers to these three dyads as the “novel trinity.” Id.
57.
Id. According to Blank, “local governments can now use international law in their
struggle against their states and other localities, and the world faces two distinct entities––the
state and localities––and it no longer addresses them as if they were the same legal creature.”
Id.
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the time he wrote, and it significantly advanced our understanding of cities’
evolving status in international affairs.
Yet, while Blank’s claims were bold, provocative, and insightful, they
were short on empirical support and––even in 2006––were quickly becoming outdated. For example, he cited three domestic court cases as support for
his claim that local governments are becoming objects of international law:
Odlocba, Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, and Crosby v. Na58
tional Foreign Trade Council. Yet, two of the three cases end with the
court reaching the opposite conclusion, and the third case, on a fuller reading, is only very weakly supportive of his claim: The Slovenian Supreme
Court in Odlocba held that the Slovenian Constitution prohibits local governance units from exceeding the size necessary for the normal functioning
of local government. (A loss for the local government.) In Metalclad, an
ICSID tribunal upheld a decision by a NAFTA tribunal that awarded Metaclad, a U.S. corporation, compensation for the losses it suffered due to the
refusal of the local Mexican authorities to let it operate a hazardous waste
facility within the jurisdiction. (Another loss for the local government.) And
in Crosby, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts government
procurement act which prohibited state entities from doing business with
companies that had business ties with Burma was invalid, as this transgressed into the federal government’s sphere. (Yet another loss for a subnational government, this time the state.) Indeed, in all three cases the federal, not the local, government was ultimately held responsible for the alleged international violation, because the cities’ obligations under IL were
considered derivative of the state’s, just as expected under classic black let59
ter IL.
Additionally, Blank repeatedly distilled cities’ IL obligations from nonbinding policy agendas, which cannot and do not constitute binding international law. For example, some of the environmental agreements that are cited, such as Agenda 21 (which “recommends” the strengthening of environmental mechanisms at “the lowest appropriate level”), are not treaties or

58.
Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, 920–24 n.153 (citing Odlocba st. UI-90/94, Uradni list Republike Slovenije, st. 29/94, http://www.sigov.si/us/eus-decs.html
(Slovn.)), 155 (citing Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 (2001)), and 163 (citing Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363 (2000)).
59.
For example, Blank claimed that local governments are “initiating and forming”
transnational law through agreements with “localities across borders,” but only, as he explicitly acknowledged, “when authorized by their states.” Blank, The City and the World, supra
note 26, at 906 (emphasis added). In another example, Blank concluded that the Slovenian
Supreme Court’s opinion in Odlocba restricting localities from exceeding the size necessary
for their normal functioning based on “the European concept of local government” demonstrates “the fact that global governance projects increasingly develop a comprehensive view of
localities, which they previously lacked.” Id. at 920. But, in reality, this is an example of a
branch of the national government (the judiciary) imposing its will on localities, not of international law.
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international legal instruments at all, but only policy agendas. Likewise,
while Blank conceded that the voluntary private agreements that localities
make with the World Bank in exchange for loans and financial assistance
“do not count as international law,” he still used them as examples of the
61
growing relevance of cities to international law. Moreover, some of his examples simply don’t hold up to scrutiny, such as his reference to a transborder agreement signed between Israeli and Palestinian localities over a
shared resource (a polluted water basin), which he upholds as an example of
62
localities engaging in bottom up international law-making. The relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories has a unique status under
international law, making examples of their agreements over territorial resources unrepresentative and incomparable to other jurisdictions. What
Blank upheld as an example of international law being made from the
ground-up by two localities was, in reality, an agreement forged between an
occupier nation and a dependent territory. Finally, in certain instances Blank
overstated his claim, such as when he asserted that the creation of UNHabitat, which focuses on empowering cities, brought cities “closer to ob63
taining the status of international legal subjects.” The creation of UNHabit, while perhaps emboldening of the claim that cities are now important
global actors, has in no way brought cities closer to becoming subjects of
64
international law, at least in the traditional sense.
In sum, though Blank made bold and revolutionary claims––claims that,
if true, would require an overhaul of the existing state-based international
65
legal framework––the empirical record does not bear them out. The structure of Blank’s article reflects this: As Blank’s article unfolds, he ratchets
down his assertions, first claiming that cities are close to becoming subjects
66
of IL, a groundless claim at odds with IL, then that cities are increasingly
67
bound by “international duties, standards and norms,” before finally con-

60.
Id. at 906.
61.
Id. at 915–17.
62.
Id. at 906.
63.
Id. at 908. Blank also stated that the World Charter on Local Government could
conceivably, if adopted, “become jus cogens.” Id. at 906. The term jus cogens (which refers to
peremptory norms, or norms that are not derogable by states), however, applies only to individual principles or rights, not to entire charters or treaties. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001), at 45. Application of the term jus
cogens is highly contentious and rare. See Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15
EURO. J. INT’L L. 97 (2004) (debating the application of the term to the prohibition against
torture, an almost universally recognized human right).
64.
While it is true that UN-Habitat focuses on empowering cities and other “human
settlements” to act more independently, that does not, on its face, say anything about the legal
status of cities within international law.
65.
This will be further highlighted in the sections below.
66.
Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 929.
67.
Id. at 903.
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cluding only that they are only “exposed” to “international norms, obliga68
tions and tribunals.”
Gerald Frug and David Barron’s seminal article, published in the same
year, makes similarly bold claims, provides similarly informative insights––
69
and submits similarly weak evidence. The authors looked to three broad
categories of evidence to support their argument that IL is now decisively
70
defining the relationship between cities and their national governments.
First, they examined cities’ rise to prominence internationally, as evidenced
71
through the formation of city networks, the “municipal foreign policy
72
73
movement,” and the push for a World Charter of Local Self-Government.
Second, they looked at “international interventions into city decisionmaking,” discussing both UN-Habitat’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance and cities’ potential role in monitoring and enforcing international
74
human rights law. Third, and most prominently, they examined “international controls on city land use powers,” as exemplified in a series of inter75
national arbitral decisions that impacted or involved cities.
Turning to the authors’ first category of evidence: While their empirical
evidence powerfully highlights the emerging relationship between the global and the local, it does not further their argument––at times explicit and at
other times implicit ––that cities are now shapers and makers of IL. The authors are right to categorize the rise and spread of city networks as a transnational or international trend (though I prefer the word ‘global’ to international, as further described below), but not to claim that this trend has
altered established international law. This phenomenon could more accurately be characterized as part of the new, more “disaggregated” international political arena and “networked” world order, where power is diffuse
and coalitions of actors, both governmental and non-governmental, collec76
tively and on their own, work to effectuate global change. In other words,
the patterns and examples cited by Frug and Barron are perhaps better classified as political trends, pertaining to the array of actors now active at the
international level, rather than international legal developments that have
altered the traditional nature of international law in any meaningful way.
While the nature of power is, indeed, changing and diffusing globally, international law has failed to keep up; indeed, its sources, processes, institu68.
Id. at 905.
69.
See Frug & Barron, supra note 16.
70.
Id. at 22.
71.
Id. at 23–27.
72.
Id. at 28.
73.
Id. at 29. This Charter never went beyond draft form. See UN Ctr. for Human Settlements & World Ass’n of Cities and Local Auth. Coordination [WACLAC], Towards a
World Charter of Local Self-Government: Joint Consultation Document (May 1998),
http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/charter.html.
74.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 30–35.
75.
Id. at 36–52.
76.
Anne Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER 131 (2004).
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tions, and key actors remain largely the same. Scholars like Frug, Barron,
and Blank seem to be confusing and conflating changes in international political patterns and arrangements with changes in the foundational legal order that continues to prevail.
Similarly, Frug and Barron’s discussion of the “municipal foreign policy movement,” while illuminating in its own right, does not pertain to inter77
national law. Their examples focus mostly on rebellious cities that publicly
oppose their states’ foreign policies. Yet the case law they cite, such as
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade, supports the conclusion that states remain in firm control over the affairs, both foreign and domestic, of their
78
sub-national governments. Finally, their enthusiasm over the World Charter of Local Self-Government, which would have elevated cities to legal
79
subjects under IL if adopted, seems, in retrospect, misplaced. This proposal has gone nowhere and seems, nearly fifteen years later, to largely be
80
abandoned.
Frug and Barron then turned to evidence of “good urban governance
and international development,” focusing heavily on the UN-Habitat Campaign on Urban Governance. They asserted that the “concept paper” for this
81
campaign established “good urban governance” as an “international legal
82
obligation.” This is, at best, a misleading conflation of a variety of legal
and non-legal norms. As a later UN Human Settlement Program report noted, many of the norms endorsed as core to good urban governance in the
concept paper––sustainability, subsidiarity, efficiency, safety––”do not have

77.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 27–29 (describing the international municipal
movement as the engagement of local authorities at the international level on issues of international importance, autonomous of their national counterparts).
78.
Supra note 58, at 372–74. As briefly discussed in regard to Blank’s reliance on
Crosby, the U.S. Supreme Court actually held that the Massachusetts sanctions on Burma
were implicitly preempted because they would undermine the “intended purpose and ‘natural
effect’” of a conflicting federal sanctions statute. Id. at 373. In fact, Frug and Barron admit
that this case suggests it is “likely” that cities will similarly be unable to engage in “these
kinds of initiatives.” Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 28.
79.
Id. at 29. The World Charter of Local Self-Government was modeled on the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which was adopted in 1993. While it took root at the
European regional level, it went beyond the draft phase and never took root at the international level. Though Frug and Barron conceded that the World Charter of Local Self-Government
was still “just an idea,” they nevertheless offered it as “an important indicator of the current
state of thinking about international local government law because it contains language that
would revise local government law around the world.” Id.
80.
This Charter is largely no longer talked about among diplomats, international city
networks, or scholars of city diplomacy.
81.
UN-Habitat, The Global Campaign on Urban Governance, U.N. Doc. HS/650/02E
(Concept Paper: 2d ed., May 2002) [hereinafter Global Campaign on Urban Governance Concept Paper].
82.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 31.
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any existence in human rights law,” and the term “urban governance” itself
83
“does not appear in [any] legally binding texts.”
Turning to their third and most robust category of evidence, the authors
confidently asserted that through “international controls on city land use
powers,” cities’ international influence leaves the world of “progressive re84
alization” and, presumably, enters the world of actualized realization. As
proof, they cited to a series of international arbitral decisions over international trade agreements as “transforming the traditional domestic legal rela85
tionship between cities and higher levels of government.” But, yet again,
two of the four cases the authors cited in support of the their argument––
86
87
Metaclad v. United Mexican States and TECMED ––can actually be cited
to endorse the opposite conclusion: that states are responsible for the inter88
national legal violations of their sub-national governments. Despite that,
Frug and Barron concluded that the holdings of Metalclad and TECMED
are both “striking” and “important” to the development of local government
89
90
law. The two other cases discussed, Republic of Chile v. MTD Equity and
91
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, come to similar conclusions:
Cities are demoted in relevance and immunized from legal liability, while
states are elevated in importance and relevance and are ultimately held responsible for the actions of their renegade municipalities. In all four cases,
cities’ ability to operate autonomously from national government control is
92
constrained by an international trade agreement.
83.
UN Human Settlement Program, International Legal Instruments Addressing Good
Governance (Sept. 2002), at 5, https://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2107_
72061_Intl%20legal%20instruments%20good%20gov%20publication.pdf. Notice that norms
and law are not equivalent––either in the domestic context or in the international legal context. 11 JEFFRY FRIEDEN, DAVID LAKE, & KENNETH SHULTZ, WORLD POLITICS: INTERESTS,
INTERACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 2012).
84.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 36.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 40–44 (discussing Metalclad Corp v. United Mexican States, supra note 58,
which failed to prevent the city of Guadalcazar from shutting down the private corporation’s
landfill operations but resulted in a multi-million dollar award in favor of the private investor
and against Mexico––while admitting that important aspects of this case were later overturned).
87.
Id. at 45 n.210 (citing TECMED v. United Mexican States, 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004)).
Frug and Barronnote that the city of Hermosillo successfully refused to allow a private investor an opportunity to operate a waste treatment facility following widespread public opposition. But, like in Metaclad, the private investor successfully won its international legal suit
against the state of Mexico, not against the city.
88.
See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/97/1, Submission of the Government of the U.S., ¶¶ 3–5 (July 28, 1999),
https://www.italaw.com/cases/671.
89.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 41, 47.
90.
Republic of Chile v. MTD Equity, 44 I.L.M. 91 (2005).
91.
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003).
92.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 51 (“All four of the cases . . . discussed demonstrate how arbitration decisions made under international trade agreements have the potential
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Frug and Barron’s analysis that cities are now shaping IL simply does
not suffice to refute state supremacy, a tenant of black letter IL. They conceded that international trade law “often prompt[s] states to exert strict regulatory control over their local governments” and gives them “new reasons to
93
police their cities.” Moreover, international trade agreements, Frug and
Barron admitted, typically do not address cities specifically, “do not make
94
cities directly liable,” are formed between nation-states, and focus narrowly “on the rights of investors and the obligations of the national govern95
ment.” They even conceded in their conclusion that “[a]ny impact on city
power or central/local relations is likely either to be overlooked or treated as
96
irrelevant.” If anything, their legal analysis further reinforces the standard
view that cities are irrelevant and powerless under IL, including under international trade agreements.
Where Frug, Barron, and Blank’s conclusions are useful, and exceedingly so, is in their confirmation that the local and global are now connected
and impacting each other in a variety of consequential new ways. They each
persuasively argue that IL is influencing cities directly and that cities are, in
certain instances, influencing IL. This latter argument, while less their focus
and more my own, is particularly apparent with respect to their discussions
of international human rights.
In that area, their conclusions reinforce more recent scholarship on cit97
ies’ role as monitors and enforcers of human rights law and on the ways in
which cities are becoming empowered to “leapfrog” over and above their
states to further their own progressive agendas. In particular, a review of the
three authors’ discussions of cities’ involvement with human rights law reveals that cities are most successful in advancing human rights norms when
engaged in shaming, advocacy campaigns, and other soft power tactics, or
when they incorporate international human rights into their own urban policies and local ordinances, which transform international law over which cit98
ies have less or no agency into locally enforceable domestic law.
These observations were recently confirmed by the research of international human rights scholars Barbara Oomen and Moritz Baumgärtel, who
found that local actors increasingly claim and perform key roles in the reali-

of limiting city power over land use by formulating rules of international local government
law.”).
93.
Id. at 39.
94.
Id. at 38. International trade agreements are solely between states. International investment treaties, though formed between states, can be considered open-ended contracts between states and private actors. Frug and Barron seem mostly focused on investment disputes
under international trade agreements. Id. at 51.
95.
Id. at 52.
96.
Id.
97.
See Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5.
98.
Id. at 268; Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 33; Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note
5, at 615–16 (discussing how certain cities have codified international treaties, such as the
Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, into local law).
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99

zation of IL. Blank seemed right on when he declared, back in 2006, that
“[l]ocalities have become autonomous enforcers of international norms,”
100
specifically avoiding the term “law.” Cities are now helping to implement
and enforce IL, and cities are being affected by international legal norms.
Where the arguments advanced by Blank, Barron, and Frug fall short, however, is with respect to the claim that cities are directly shaping and making
IL and that their actions are decisively starting to impact the system of international governance rather than the other way round. A closer examination reveals that they typically cite international norms and standards rather
than international law itself; and they often overlook that when these norms
are challenged in court, cities often fail to advance their cause.
The truth is, cities remain disconnected from black letter IL except
through the intermediation of states, and no amount of creative lawyering or
interpretive gymnastics can change that fact, at least so long as the current
international legal framework remains in place. Until then, we need new
verbiage and a new prism through which to make sense of the changing role
of cities in international affairs. Such a framework will be offered in Part
IV, but first we turn to the myriad ways in which cities are effectively piercing and influencing the state-centric realm of global politics.

III. Cities and International Relations
Cities are strengthening their collective voice in international politics
and leapfrogging over their national governments to engage at the international level. To do so, they are using six primary strategies (previewed in
the introduction to this article), some of which overlap and compound each
other. Cities are (1) forming into international networks and coalitions; (2)
allying with international organizations; (3) gaining seats on United Nations
decision-making bodies and inclusion in multilateral agendas; (4) mirroring
state-based coalitions and hosting their own state-like “international summits;” (5) utilizing the language of IL to advance their own agendas; and (6)
adopting non-binding resolutions and agreements and holding each other to
account. Using these six strategies, cities––especially the world’s largest
101
102
and most economically prosperous mega-cities and global cities ––have
99.
Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 621.
100.
Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 924.
101.
Mega-cities are cities that have populations of over 10 million residents. U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Data Booklet: The World’s Cities in 2018 (2018),
https://www.un.org/en/events/citiesday/assets/pdf/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_data_booklet.p
df.
102.
Unlike for “mega-city,” there is no single agreed-upon definition of “global city.”
However, most definitions emphasize the importance of economic clout; a global city must
play a significant role in the global economy. Key examples include New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong. Saskia Sassen, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago,
is considered to be among the first scholars to define and conceptualize the term “global city.”
Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 2 (Winter/Spring 2005). Professor Sassen defined global cities as “the terrain where a multiplicity of
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achieved a level of participation and influence in international affairs argua103
bly not seen since before the modern post-Westphalian era.
Each of these six strategies is deserving of a paper-length analysis on its
own. For the purposes of this paper, however, each will only be briefly described and illustrated through concrete empirical examples.

A. Forming into Networks
Even without formal recognition within IL, cities are charging ahead
104
and upward to gain autonomy at the global level. The primary way in
which cities are doing this is by embracing the power of numbers and form105
ing into coalitions, called “city networks.” Cities have discovered that
their voices are amplified and their influence enlarged when they act in formal association with other cities, including cities from both within and be106
yond their own national borders. Though not a new phenomenon––the
rise of city networks can be traced back to at least the early twentieth centu107
ry, if not long before ––these networks, particularly international city net108
109
works, have substantially proliferated in recent decades. With well over
two hundred international city networks active today, “city diplomacy is no
110
rare occurrence.” Indeed, it is now a “widespread phenomenon” that is
111
“expanding” and changing the face of international affairs.
What is new and different about city networks, when examining their
objectives throughout the twentieth century to the present, is that many
globalization processes assume concrete, localized forms.” Id. at 40. Other definitions vary.
Compare Aaron M. Renn, What Is a Global City?, NEW GEOGRAPHY (Dec. 2012),
http://www.newgeography.com/content/003292-what-is-a-global-city (defining a global city
as “a significant production point of specialized financial and producer services that make the
globalized economy run”), with Victor Kiprop, What Is a Global City?, WORLDATLAS (Oct.
5, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-a-global-city.html (defining a global
city as a “city that plays a significant role in the global economic system”).
103.
See generally THE POWER OF CITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Simon Curtis
ed., 2014).
104.
They are also doing this at the national level, but this article focuses on the global
sphere.
105.
City networks are “institutionalized governance structures facilitating city-to-city
and city-to-other actors cooperation.” Michele Acuto, Mika Morissette, & Agis Tsouros, City
Diplomacy: Towards More Strategic Networking? Learning with WHO Health Cities 2017, 8
GLOBAL POLICY 14, 15 (2017).
106.
Michele Acuto & Steve Rayner, City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or Forging
(New) Lock-ins, 92 INT’L AFF. 1147, 1159–60 (2016).
107.
Id. at 1155.
108.
International city networks are coalitions of three of more cities from at least three
different countries. These can be contrasted with national city networks, such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, that include only cities from the same country. See UNITED STATES
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, https://www.usmayors.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
109.
Acuto & Rayner, supra note 106, at 1151.
110.
Acuto, Morissette, & Tsouros, supra note 105, at 16.
111.
Id.
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(though not all) are now devoting additional resources and energy to inter112
national lobbying, or city diplomacy, at the global level. Unlike the city
networks of earlier times, which focused largely on city-to-city “twinning”
initiatives (such as Sister Cities) or gatherings to discuss best practices,
many of the international city networks active today are not only engaging
in joint projects and best-practice swapping, but they are also attempting to
access and influence the international policymaking process in new and un113
precedented ways. This transformation of city diplomacy is described variously as “municipal internationalism,” “transnational municipal network114
ing,” and “municipal foreign policy making.”
City networks that participate are said to be in the “International Munic115
ipal Movement.” These include the C40 Climate Leadership Group
116
117
(“C40”), United Cities and Local Governments (“UCLG”), Cities Alli118
119
120
ance, EUROCITIES, and ICLEI to name just a few. These networks
have had varying levels of success but, in a few cases, certain large-scale
networks have acquired legitimate seats at tables that were previously

112.
Michele Acuto, City Diplomacy, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY 510,
517 (2016).
113.
Aaron Fishbone, City Networks: Evaluating the Next Frontier of International Relations, Urban and Regional Policy (The German Marshall Fund of the U.S.: Urban and Regional Policy, No. 2, 2017); see Benjamin Leffel & Michele Acuto, Economic Power Foundations of Cities in Global Governance, 32 GLOBAL SOCIETY 281 (2018).
114.
Fishbone, supra note 113, at 5; Leffel & Acuto, supra 113, at 281–82.
115.
Kate Baird, A New International Municipalist Movement Is on the Rise––From
Small Victories to Global Alternatives, OPEN DEMOCRACY (June 7, 2017),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/new-international-municipalistmovement-is-on-rise-from-small-vic.
116.
C40 CITIES, About, https://www.c40.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). C40 is a network of the world’s megacities commited to addressing climate change; it began with 40 cities and now has 94. Id.
117.
UCLG, Who We Are, https://www.uclg.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). UCLG is an
umbrella organization for cities, local and regional governments, and municipal associations
throughout the world defending their interests internationally and promoting democratic local
self-government. UCLG was founded in 1913 and is the largest of all the city networks, with
over 240,000 city members in over 140 countries. Id.
118.
CITIES ALLIANCE, About, https://wwww.citiesalliance.org (last visited Jan. 13,
2020). Cities Alliance is a city network that promotes long-term programmatic approaches
that support national and local governments to develop appropriate policy frameworks,
strengthen local skills and capacity, undertake strategic city planning, and facilitate investment.” Id.
119.
EUROCITIES, www.eurocities.eu (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). EUROCITIES is a
network of large cities in Europe, established in 1986 to further economic, political and social
development in its member cities. Today, EUROCITIES includes local governments of over
140 of Europe’s major cities from 39 countries, which between them comprise 130 million
people. Id.
120.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY [ICLEI], About Us, https://iclei.org
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020). ICLEI “is a global network of more than 1,750 local and regional
governments committed to sustainable urban development.” Id.
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121

states-only. For example, UCLG, the behemoth of all the city networks,
permanently holds ten of the twenty seats on the UN Advisory Committee
122
on Local Authorities (“UNACLA”) and serves as its president. By establishing a formalized position within the UN, even if only on topics pertaining specifically to cities, UCLG has been able to shape various multilateral
agendas, notably including the Habitat III process and the Sustainable De123
velopment Goals (“SDGs”). According to one scholar who has closely
studied the rise of city networks, Michele Acuto, “cities are not only critical
st
contexts for an urbanizing 21 century,” but, through their networks, they
are proving to be “effective actors, taking part in the dynamics of global
124
governance.”
The power of international city networks lies in the power of numbers:
Voices are louder and actions more visible when more actors combine forces. According to a declaration issued by the International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities, a network of cities with over 500 members that
advocates for inclusive urban development:
[W]orking collectively as a network has added value and impact
because city-to-city collaboration serves as a platform to build a
common voice in global forums, which reinforces a unified stand
125
for sustainable urban development.
Networks of networks are also arising, with city networks joining forces
to advance certain causes or goals, or to simply further amplify their voices.
UCLG, C40, and ICLEI, which are all members of the Global Taskforce on
Local and Regional Governments, often conduct campaigns and initiatives
together, such as their campaign in April 2016 to get the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change to include “Cities and Climate Change” as a plank

121.
Interview with Brendan Shane, Regional Director for North American, C40 (Oct.
10, 2018), (stating that the C40 has gained a “legitimate seat at the international policymaking table.”).
122.
UN-HABITAT, UN Advisory Committee on Local Authorities [UNACLA],
https://www.global-taskforce.org/united-nations-advisory-committee-local-authorities
(last
visited Apr. 11, 2020). UNACLA was created in 2000 with the goal of strengthening the dialogue between the UN system and local authorities. Id.
123.
See UCLG, You Can’t Miss UCLG at the Habitat III Conference in Quito (Sept. 30,
2016), https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/you-cant-miss-uclg-habitat-iii-conference-quito.
Through city networks’ involvement in this process, along with the support of others from
civil society, UCLG was able to get one of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals
(“SDGs”), SDG 11, devoted to cities; SDG 11 is focused on building “sustainable cities and
communities.” UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Goal 11: Sustainable Cities
and Communities, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-developmentgoals/goal-11-sustainable-cities-and-communities.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
124.
Michele Acuto, Engaging with Global Urban Governance, in 7 DOING GLOBAL
URBAN RESEARCH 96, 106 (John Harrison & Michael Holyer eds., 2018).
125.
U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], ICCAR Global Steering Committee Declaration of Nancy, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/declaration_nancy_2018.pdf.
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126

of its work program. C40, which began with forty of the world’s largest
and wealthiest cities but now includes ninety-six cities representing a quarter of the global economy, has been particularly successful at accomplishing
its agenda, likely due in part to its ample resources and celebrity endorse127
ment. Created in 2005, C40 is now focused, first and foremost, on “delivering on the most ambitious goals of the Paris [Climate] Agreement at the
local level”––by ensuring that its members commit to meeting (or exceeding) the obligations contained in the Paris Agreement irrespective of wheth128
er their national counterparts have made this commitment. To advance its
efforts, C40 has gone beyond mere knowledge-sharing, becoming a worldrenowned international lobbyist and actively working to shape global policy
discussions on climate change. Through its lobbying work, C40 has been
instrumental in connecting its member cities with global policy-makers and
forums by, for example, arranging for high-profile city-led events to be held
129
alongside high-profile state-led events, as further described below. In
short, large-scale city networks like C40 not only serve as a connector between and among cities but also as a connector between the local and the
130
global.

B. Allying with International Organizations
Cities’ increased participation and influence at the international level
has been facilitated by a close and supportive relationship with certain key
international organizations. For over a decade, the UN Center for Human
Settlements (“UN-Habitat”), the EU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the World
Health Organization (“WHO”), and the World Bank––among other international, transnational, and regional organizations––have promoted the im131
portance and centrality of cities to their development goals. Certain re126.
E.g., GLOBAL TASKFORCE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, C40, ICLEI,
and UCLG Support Proposed IPCC Special Report on Cities and Climate Change (Mar. 30,
2016),
https://www.global-taskforce.org/c40-iclei-and-uclg-support-proposed-ipcc-specialreport-cities-and-climate-change.
127.
See C40 CITIES, About, supra note 116. C40 is financially backed, in part, by
Bloomberg Philanthropies, and former mayor Michael Bloomberg has been very involved and
active in his support for this network; he continues to serve as the president of the board. See
C40 CITIES, Board of Directors, https://www.c40.org/board_of_directors (last visited Jan. 13,
2019).
128.
Id.
129.
See infra, Part III.D.
130.
Chan, supra note 1, at 151.
131.
For example, the World Bank devotes a portion of its vast portfolio to “urban development,” which itself is carved up into distinct thematic areas, including “sustainable cities
and communities” and “inclusive cities.” For each of these themes, the World Bank has projects and teams in place to support them. See WORLD BANK, Urban Development,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/urbandevelopment (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). The
World Bank, together with the International Monetary Fund and others, hosts an annual “Urbanization and Poverty Reduction” research conference. See WORLD BANK, 5th Urbanization
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gional intergovernmental organizations, such as the Council of Europe, have
gone even further to advocate for the city-empowering concepts of “decentralization,” “subsidiarity,” and enhanced local autonomy in their official
132
policy pronouncements and press releases. Various scholars have noted
that cities’ alliances with powerful international organizations have been instrumental in propelling them onto the world stage by giving them both a
voice and a formal platform, in addition to recognition, in the historically
133
states-only halls of global governance. There is a growing tendency for
cities, particularly large global cities, and international organizations to recognize that they have a “convergence of interests,” or a “common agen134
da.”
Just as cities are finding it “harder, if not impossible . . . to accomplish
[their] governance, economic and wellbeing goals without considering in135
ternational action,” international organizations have simultaneously recognized that cities are the “privileged loc[i]” for achieving their own sus136
Frug and Barron first recognized this
tainable development goals.
and Poverty Reduction Research Conference (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/
en/events/2018/05/02/5th-urbanization-and-poverty-reduction-research-conference.
UNHabitat is focused on human settlements and sustainable urban development. See UNHABITAT, About Us, https://unhabitat.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2020). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], which works closely with UNHabitat, is an intergovernmental organization focused on sustainable development. One of its
area of focus includes “urban development,” and it hosts the “OECD Roundtable of Mayors
and Ministers” in order for local and national leaders to engage in policy dialogue on urban
issues. See OECD, OECD Work on Cities, http://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionalpolicy/urbandevelopment.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
132.
See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 10 Years (2007–2017) of Intercultural Cities: Making Diversity Work for Cities, Press Release, Ref. DC 173 (2017); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Paris
Joins Council of Europe Intercultural Cities Network, Press Release, Ref. DC 055 (2016);
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Rotterdam: Summit of Mayors for the ”Alliance of European cities
against violent extremism”, Press Release, Ref. CG-CP034 (2016); COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
Making Cities Resilient, Chamber of Local Authorities, CPL 22(2) (Mar. 2, 2012),
https://rm.coe.int/090000168071a65d; see also Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, supra note 48, at 267. The European Charter of Local Self Government was adopted by
the Council of Europe and opened for signature in 1985; all 47 members of the Council have
adopted this charter. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, A Charter for Local Democracy,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/european-charter-of-local-self-government (last visited
Jan. 13, 2019).
133.
See, e.g., Porras, supra note 12; Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order,
supra note 48; Frug & Barron, supra note 16; Acuto, supra note 124, at 106.
134.
Porras, supra note 12, at 555 (“When cities turned to international organizations,
they thus found a receptive audience and a ready embrace. . . . [T]he city was considered to
offer the greatest potential for democratic empowerment, accountability, flexibility, [and] responsiveness to major stakeholders (including international organizations, public and private
investors) and local knowledge. . . . The result was that international organizations, responding to cities’ demands, have adopted the city as an ideal partner to realize their development
goals.”); see Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 879–80.
135.
Acuto et al., ‘City Diplomacy’ and Twinning: Lessons from the UK, China and
Globally 24 (UK Gov’t Office for Science: Future of Cities, Working Paper, 2016).
136.
Porras, supra note 12, at 576.
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connection well over a decade ago, and it forms a core part of their research
agenda on international local government law, as previously discussed.
Their recognition of the connection between cities and international organizations inspired a broader “refocus on cities as the objects of international
norms,” a topic that has been extended and deepened by a variety of other
scholars, including Barbara Oomen, Martha David, and Moritz Baumgärtel,
and researchers affiliated with the Asser Institute’s project on global cities
and international law, including Miha Marcenko, Janne Nijman, and Helmut
137
Aust.
Cities and their networks now regularly partner with international organizations. The UCLG alone has an endless list of partnerships, including
with the European Commission, Agence Française de Développement, the
International Labour Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, the UN Development Program, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN Educational, Scientific
138
and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”). These alliances not only help
city networks to acquire the necessary resources and tools to pursue their
local and global agendas, but they provide access to the international policymaking world and give the networks a more formal and identifiable platform than they would otherwise have on their own. Linking up with an international organization, especially one that is already active in international
policy debates, can give cities and their networks access to those debates
and, therefore, an opportunity to influence them.
For example, the UCLG linked up with the International Organization
for Migration (“IOM”), the leading inter-governmental organization in the
field of migration, in November 2017 to draft and then issue the Mechelen
Declaration, a statement calling for a greater role and voice for city gov139
ernments in the adoption of a Global Compact on Migration. The impri-

137.
E.g., Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5; GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES, supra note 15. Researchers Aust and Nijman at the Asser Institute are
currently working on compiling a co-edited Handbook on International Law and Cities to be
published by Edward Edgar Publishing. I am co-authoring a chapter for this Handbook with
Professor Sheila Foster of Georgetown law; it is entitled “The Urbanization of International
Legal Relations: Cities Rising Soft Power and Soft Law in the Global Context.”
138.
UCLG,
International
Organisations,
https://www.uclg.org/en/partners/
international-organisations (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
139.
Global Conference on Cities and Migration, Mechelen Declaration on Cities and
Migration
[hereinafter
Mechelen
Declaration]
(Nov.
17,
2017),
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/Mechelen-Declaration-final.pdf; Ana
Maria Lebada, Cities Adopt Declaration for Global Compact on Migration, SDG
KNOWLEDGE HUB: A PROJECT BY IISD (Dec. 5, 2017), http://sdg.iisd.org/news/cities-adoptdeclaration-for-global-compact-on-migration (“The [Mechelen] Declaration builds on the
SDGs, the New Urban Agenda and the New York Declaration on Migrants and Refugees. In
an annex, it presents the mayors and leaders’ actionable commitments, means of implementation, and a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, which serves as the basis for the first follow-up and review of the migration-related commitments included in the New Urban Agenda.
The document recognizes the importance of a community-driven approach to local urban gov-
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matur of the IOM legitimated and amplified the call for cities’ involvement
in global policy discussions on migration and led to the creation of a
“Mayor’s Mechanism,” which now provides a formal channel for local gov140
ernments to be involved in these global discussions.
As previously mentioned, this relationship is reciprocal: International
organizations also ally with cities to advance their own goals. For example,
the WHO’s Healthy Cities Program has worked closely with localities for
more than three decades to ensure that issues of health are included in the
141
agendas of city governments. The alliance between cities and the WHO
led, in November 2016, to the Shanghai Declaration on Promoting Health in
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which formally recognized
cities as “critical settings for health” and, therefore, essential contributors to
142
international policy discussions on health. Similarly, the World Bank,
which views urban development as key to resolving issues of global poverty, routinely emphasizes the idea that urbanization is one of the key global
143
trends of the twenty-first century.
As with migration and health, linking cities to the problem of global
poverty has helped to position cities as legitimate participants in international policy discussions on poverty, as evidenced by their inclusion in Sus144
tainable Development Goal 11. The World Economic Forum recently
acknowledged that cities are transforming how foreign policy is conducted.
Cities, it asserts, are now engaging in “paradiplomacy,” or parallel diploma145
cy separate and autonomous from their national leaders. They are opening
up their own international affairs offices abroad in order to represent their
own local interests and foster international collaborations, participating in
“international multilateral arrangements,” ensuring that their international
roles are codified in their country’s foundational documents, and adopting

ernance that benefits communities of origin, transit, and destination as well as migrants, refugees, returnees and internally displaced people (IDPs).”)
140.
The creation of the Mayor’s Mechanism is discussed in more depth, infra, Part
III.C.
141.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], Types of Healthy Settings,
https://www.who.int/healthy_settings/types/cities/en (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
142.
Ninth Global Conference on Health Promotion, Shanghai Declaration on Promoting Health in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Nov. 24, 2016),
https://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/9gchp/shanghai-declaration.pdf.
143.
See WORLD BANK, Urban Development, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
urbandevelopment (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
NATIONS,
Sustainable
Dev.
Goal
11,
144.
See
UNITED
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). SDG 11 is focused
on “sustainable cities and communities.” Id.
145.
Rodrigo Tavares, Forget the Nation-State: Cities Will Transform the Way We Conduct Foreign Affairs, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/10/forget-the-nation-state-cities-will-transform-the-way-we-conduct-foreignaffairs.
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their own foreign policy “actions plans,” “white papers,” and “government
146
plans.”
Public international organizations are not the only ones allying with cities. Alliances are also common between cities and private international organizations. While not as directly linked to the international policymaking
world, these private institutions have helped to further the idea that cities are
essential to solving our global challenges. The Rockefeller Foundation, a
private international charitable organization, has worked with city governments since 2013 through its 100 Resilient Cities program, which focuses
on preparing cities to be ready for the physical, social, and economic chal147
lenges of the twenty-first century. The Foundation’s idea that cities need
to be resilient and ready for disasters trickled into the UN’s agenda, through
the “making cities resilient” campaign launched by the UN Office for Disas148
ter Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework. While not as directly giving cities a global voice or a platform to further their own policy agendas,
the 100 Resilient Cities program exemplifies how a privately funded initiative focused on empowering cities caught the attention of the United Nations and helped to promote the idea that cities are central to global policies
on resiliency.
Cities and city networks are finding ways to effectively leverage their
alliances with international organizations, both governmental and private, in
order to further promote the critical roles that cities play––or should play––
in twenty-first century global governance.

C. Gaining Recognition in Multilateral Agendas
Cities and city networks are increasingly recognized as important global
actors, with critical perspectives, valuable experience, and useful insights to
contribute to international policymaking discussions. In October of 2016,
for example, the vast majority of the world’s states––170 to be exact––
agreed to adopt a “New Urban Agenda,” an international, UN-led long-term
mission that acknowledges that cities will grow massively over the next
149
thirty years and become central to future global development. This agenda

146.
Id.
147.
100 RESILIENT CITIES, About Us, http://www.100resilientcities.org/about-us (last
visited Jan. 13, 2020).
148.
UN OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, Making Cities Resilient,
https://www.unisdr.org/we/campaign/cities (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
149.
G.A. Res. 71/256, The New Urban Agenda (Dec. 23, 2016), http://habitat3.org/thenew-urban-agenda. The New Urban Agenda was issued in Quito, Ecuador at the end of 2016.
It explicitly calls for greater cooperation between national and local authorities to address the
challenges of forced migration. The Agenda stresses the need to invest in “synergies between
international migration and development at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels by ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration through planned and well-managed
migration policies, and . . . supporting local authorities in establishing frameworks that enable
the positive contribution of migrants to cities and strengthened urban-rural linkages.” Robert
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was adopted at the Habitat III conference in Ecuador, an event that “catalyzed the world’s attention to cities as the places where a global agenda for
150
sustainable development can start.” During this conference, cities and
their networks were “firmly on the front stage, notably C40 Cities and
UCLG, with visible performances, commitments and interventions”
151
throughout. According to city network scholar Michele Acuto, “[t]his tells
st
us that cities are not only critical contexts for an urbanizing 21 century,
they can be effective actors, taking part in the dynamics of global govern152
ance.”
This same recognition is codified in a variety of other international instruments and agendas as well, including the UN Sustainable Development
Goals (goal eleven, specifically), which form the core of the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development; the Paris Climate Agreement; the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and
the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, all of which, to
one extent or another, center around the idea that sustainable urbanization is
key to successful development. Moreover, an entire UN agency, UNHabitat, was created in 1978 to focus on urban themes, initiatives, and
knowledge; it claims to have “a unique and a universally acknowledged expertise in all things urban” due to its decades of experience working with
153
cities. UN-Habitat was arguably the first major UN initiative to catalyze
the world’s attention to cities as the places where a global agenda for sus154
tainable development can start. Today it is focused on enacting the New
Urban Agenda (“NUA”), an agenda focused on the idea that a sustainable
future starts in cities and on the “transformative power of urbanization,” as
155
well as implementing SDG eleven. The NUA underlines the linkages between urbanization and job creation, livelihood opportunities, and improved
quality of life, which should be included in every urban renewal policy and
156
strategy.
The importance of cities to global governance and to solving our global
challenges is not a new idea. Before the “New Urban Agenda” of 2016, the
Muggah & Adriana Abdenur, Refugees and the City: The Twenty-First-Century Front Line 7
(World Refugee Council, Working Paper No. 2, 2018).
150.
UN-HABITAT, UNACLA, supra note 122.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
UN-HABITAT, UN-Habitat at a Glance, https://unhabitat.org (last visited Jan. 13,
2020).
154.
UN-HABITAT, About Us, https://unhabitat.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
155.
UN HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, World Cities Rep. 2016, at 35 (July 14,
2016), https://doi.org/10.18356/d201a997-en; SUSTAINABILITY ACTIVE, UN-Habitat Assembly 2019 Focuses on the New Urban Agenda and Sustainable Urban Development (May 29,
2019),
https://sustainabilityactive.com/2019/05/un-habitat-assembly-2019-focuses-on-thenew-urban-agenda-nua-and-sustainable-urban-development; UN-HABITAT, Implementing the
New Urban Agenda, https://mirror.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=9 (last visited Jan. 13,
2020).
156.
See G.A. Res. 71/256, The New Urban Agenda (Dec. 23, 2016).
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UN launched a Global Campaign on Urban Governance in 1999 and before that, the “First World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities” in
158
159
1996, and the “Local Agenda 21” in 1992. Each of these identifies cities
as key stakeholders and participants in the UN’s development goals.
Several formal institutions and permanent platforms now exist within
the UN for cities to participate in global policymaking on a regular basis.
For example, the Global Taskforce on Local and Regional Governments,
which was created in 2013 and convenes the World Assembly of Local and
Regional Governments, provides a “permanent structure [for states] to coor160
dinate their [local and regional governments’] partnership with the UN.”
In what the UCLG describes as a “landmark achievement,” the World
Assembly is acknowledged in the New Urban Agenda, confirming that
while national governments continue to play the “leading role” in the implementation of urban policies and legislation for sustainable urban development, subnational and local governments can offer “equally important
161
contributions” throughout this process. As discussed above, the Global
Task Force can also boast about the inclusion of a stand-alone SDG focused
on cities, SDG 11, and the emphasis in all seventeen SDGs on local imple162
mentation and monitoring, for which they successfully lobbied. While
these additions and successes might, at first glance, seem insignificant and
without real impact, the fact that they occurred––that cities are mentioned as
having “equally important” contributions to national governments, for example––is in and of itself an impactful and meaningful development in the
state-focused world of international politics, which is guided by the even
more state-centric international legal framework.
The UN has also created institutional roles for certain powerful city
networks. For example, a report commissioned by the UN Secretary General
in 2003 paved the way for the UCLG to take on a permanent advisory role
163
within the UN. As previously mentioned, UCLG now holds the presiden-

157.
UN-HABITAT, The Global Campaign for Urban Governance (Mar. 2002),
http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=1537.
158.
HABITAT III, Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, supra note 24.
159.
See U.N. Conf. on Env’t and Dev., Agenda 21, ¶¶ 7.13–7.26, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26, (Aug. 12, 1992), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
Agenda21.pdf.
160.
HABITAT III, Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, supra note 24.
161.
G.A. Res. 71/256, The New Urban Agenda ¶15(b) (Dec. 23, 2016).
162.
GLOBAL TASKFORCE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, Our Work,
https://www.global-taskforce.org/our-work (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
163.
In 2003, the Secretary General of the United Nations established a Panel of Eminent Persons, chaired by Fernando Enrique Cardoso, the former President of Brazil, to review
the relationship between the United Nations and civil society. Proposal 18 of the resulting
“Cardoso Report,” as it has come to be called, recommended that the United Nations “regard
United Cities and Local Governments as an advisory body on governance matters.” Panel of
Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, Letter dated June 7, 2004 from
the Panel Chair to the Secretary-General, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004),
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cy and half the seats on the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities, a
164
deliberative forum housed within UN-Habitat. Today, UNACLA serves as
an international forum where local governments can convey their opinions
and perspectives to the UN and other international actors, entirely independent of their national governments, and thus, can directly participate in
the shaping and implementing of certain global agendas, notably those per165
taining to the UN’s broadly construed Habitat agenda.
Cities and city networks feature particularly prominently in multilateral
agendas pertaining to climate change. As early as 1992, cities were recognized as relevant stakeholders in climate-related policy discussions in the
166
UN’s Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Since then, cities have become the focus of many international, regional, and transnational
167
initiatives, declarations, and agreements on climate change. Relying largely on the argument that local and regional authorities are the “closest level
of public administration to citizens” and the ones responsible for making
many of the actual decisions involved in implementing international agreements, cities––with the support of certain powerful international organizations––have successfully convinced the UN that municipalities and city
networks should have a voice in shaping climate-related international poli168
cies. The establishment of certain large-scale and well-endowed city net169
works, such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy
170
and C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group helped this argument. In 2014,
former Mayor Michael Bloomberg was named the UN Special Envoy for
171
Cities and Climate Change and, in 2016, during the twenty-second Conference of the Parties for the UN Framework Convention on Climate

https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/09916F545454357BC1256F5C005D
4352/$file/A-58-817.pdf.
164.
UN-HABITAT, UNACLA, supra note 122; UCLG, Presidency 2019–2022,
https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/presidency (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
165.
UN-HABITAT, UNACLA, supra note 122.
166.
U.N. Conf. on Env’t and Dev., Agenda 21, supra note 159.
167.
See OECD, Cities and Climate Change (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/governance/cities-and-climate-change_9789264091375-en.
168.
See OECD ET AL., International Coalition on Multi-Level and Multi-Stakeholder
Climate Governance for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement, at 1, (2018)
https://www.climate-chance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/why-is-a-multi-stakeholderapproach-to-climate-change-more-relevant.pdf.
169.
GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, Who We Are,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy was formed when the European Covenant of Mayors
merged with the Global Compact of Mayors. The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and
Energy now includes over 9,000 cities, representing over 10% of the global population. Id.
170.
C40 CITIES, About, supra note 116.
171.
Press Release, United Nations, Secretary General Appoints Michael R. Bloomberg
of United States Special Envoy for Climate Action, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1791*BIO/5069*-ENV/DEV/1836
(March
5,
2018),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/
sga1791.doc.htm.
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Change (UNFCC) in Morocco, a whole day was devoted to cities, towns,
172
and regions, and their role in implementing the Paris Agreement.
Cities have had similar success in convincing global policy makers of
their relevance to migration-related policy debates at the international level,
an easy sell given that cities are home to the vast majority of the world’s
migrants and refugees. In 2013, the UN General Assembly created a formal
institution, the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development as “an incubating space where local leaders can share practical and
inventive solutions for governing migration and promoting inclusive urban
economic growth,” as well as “inform, and be informed by, national and in173
ternational policymaking.” And in 2018, an even more robust platform
was created, the “Mayor’s Mechanism,” which allows cities to directly engage with the Global Forum on Migration and Development (“GFMD”), a
state-led forum that is responsible for shaping the global debate on migra174
tion and development. Thanks to the Mayor’s Mechanism, cities now
have a formal, institutionalized platform from which to engage in migrationrelated international policy debates alongside nation-states. According to the
GFMD’s own website, the Mayor’s Mechanism is “a means to formalize the
relationship between the government-led GFMD process and the local au175
thorities participating in the Mayoral Forum.” In what was viewed as a
major achievement for cities in international politics, the Global Compact
176
177
on Refugees and the Global Compact of Migration, both adopted in December of 2018, repeatedly reference local authorities and networks of cit178
ies. Immediately following their adoption, on the very same day, mayors
and city leaders from around the globe came together to sign their own
agreement, the Marrakesh Mayoral Declaration, calling for the full and for-

172.
U.N. NEWS, Marrakech: Cities Are Striving to Play a Key Role in Implementing
Paris Climate Accord (Nov. 10, 2016), https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/545002marrakech-cities-are-striving-play-key-role-implementing-paris-climate-accord. The twentyfirst Conference of the Parties approved this time allocation. Id.
FOR
DEVELOPMENT,
Global
Mayoral
Forum,
173.
MIGRATION
http://www.migration4development.org/en/events/global-mayoral-forum (last visited Jan. 13,
2020).
174.
Stefan Rother, Mayors Mechanism Will Become Part of the #GFMD This Year,
THE GFMD, MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (blog) (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://gfmd2010.wordpress.com/2019/01/14/mayors-mechanism-will-become-part-of-thegfmd-this-year-thouez-bolsters-position-of-gfmd-in-supporting-implementation-of-globalcompact-formigration. The Mayor’s Mechanism was conceived during the fifth Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development, which took place in Marrakech, Morocco and had as its theme “City Leadership in Implementing the UN Global Compacts.” Id.
175.
GLOBAL FORUM ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT [GFMD], The GFMD
Mayors Mechanism, https://www.gfmd.org/process/gfmd-mayors-mechanism (last visited Jan.
13, 2020).
176.
See Rep. of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc.
A/73/12 (Part II) (2018).
177.
See G.A. Res. 73/195, ¶¶ 18(c), 44 (Jan. 11, 2019).
178.
Rother, supra note 174.
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mal recognition of the role of local authorities in the implementation, fol179
low-up, and review of both compacts. The UN High Commissioner on
Refugees enthusiastically embraced the declaration in a speech highlighting
the necessity of working with city leaders to solve the global refugee cri180
sis.
Though roadblocks emerge when attempts are made to elevate cities to
a status akin to nation-states under international law, as evidenced by the
181
failure of the World Charter on Local Self-Government, cities and city
networks are decidedly part of the UN’s agenda and organizational structure
182
today. Indeed, the UN is so focused on urbanization these days that a recently commissioned independent report reviewing the Habitat agenda recommended creating a whole new UN body, called UN-Urban, to act as a
183
coordinating mechanism across all UN agencies on urban matters. This
recommendation reflects the growing importance of cities across all UN
agencies, not just UN-Habitat.
With increased participation has come increased confidence, success,
and influence. Cities and city networks are now openly declaring their right
to be involved not just as observers, consultants, or tag-alongs of their national governments, but as key stakeholders and even “equal partners in
184
shaping global policy.” Such bold statements were not heard, or at least
openly voiced, in the past.

D. Mirroring State-Based Coalitions, Events, and Structures
Another strategy increasingly used by cities and their networks to increase their influence in global policymaking is the attempt to mimic the actions of states. This allows them, in certain instances, to gain the attention of
the media as well as the states whose actions and events they are mimicking.
This is typically done on the sidelines of, or in the lead-up to, high-profile
states-only international forums and events. For example, during the COP15
Climate Summit held in Copenhagen in 2009, while 114 heads-of-state
gathered to negotiate over international climate policies, 200 mayors attend179.
FIFTH MAYORAL FORUM ON HUMAN MOBILITY, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
The Marrakech Mayors Declaration, at 2 (Dec. 8, 2018).
180.
Ariane Rummery, UNHCR Welcomes Global Mayors’ Commitment to Refugees,
UN AGENCY ON REFUGEES [UNHCR] (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/
2018/12/5c0d06a34/unhcr-welcomes-global-mayors-commitment-refugees.html.
181.
See Gerhard Engel & Alan Lloyd, Report on Draft World Charter of Local SelfGovernment State of Discussions––CPL (8) 5 Part II, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
https://rm.coe.int/1680719e98 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). For a discussion of the failure of the
World Charter, see supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
182.
See Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 25–27.
183.
Michele Acuto, Cities Are Gaining Power in Global Politics––Can the UN
Keep Up?, THE CONVERSATION, (Sept. 14, 2017), http://theconversation.com/cities-aregaining-power-in-global-politics-can-the-un-keep-up-83668.
184.
GLOBAL PARLIAMENT OF MAYORS, Newsletter (May 2, 2019) (emphasis added),
https://mailchi.mp/8296785d6e07/gpm-newsletter-march-507985.
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185

ed a parallel climate summit held in the same city. While the states-only
COP15 ended without agreement or consensus (and thus in failure), the
mayor-led parallel summit ended in widespread agreement on a variety of
collaborative efforts and was widely viewed as a success. Cities have been
186
active on the sidelines of all the COPs ever since.
Another key example involves the Group of 20 (or the “G20”), whose
twenty member states represent the world’s most economically and politi187
cally powerful states. Since its formation in 1999, it has been tasked with
188
discussing and drafting policies pertaining to global financial stability.
While the G20 has seven different engagement groups that allow for input
from non-state actors, until 2018 there was no formal group or platform for
cities. Cities took things into their own hands in December 2017 and created
189
the Urban 20, or U20, on the margins of the One Planet Summit in Paris.
The C40 and UCLG, along with the mayors of Buenos Aires and Paris, took
the lead in creating this new state-like platform comprised of the world’s
most politically and economically powerful cities, which now issue statelike statements, declarations, and communiqués, and hold state-like summits
190
on the sidelines of the states-only summits––including the G20 meetings.
In contrast to the often competitive or confrontational diplomacy between
states in intergovernmental multilateral institutions, particularly the highly
influential ones like the G20, cities and the institutions they create emphasize their shared challenges and the need to work collaboratively together in
order to solve these shared challenges. According to one scholar who closely tracks the U20:
[C]ities are much more positive and willing to engage in the topic
for mutual benefits . . . they have the willingness to listen, collaborate, help and support each other. There’s a lot of love and mutual
respect among C40 mayors: friendly cooperation, open-arms . . .
191
something that you’ll never see when you gather the G20.

185.
The Climate Summit for Mayors was held from December 14–17 in the city of Copenhagen, where the COP15 was being held. See Hang Ryeol Na & Gordon M. Heisler, C40
Large Cities Climate Summit 2009, from Seoul to Copenhagen, 34 INT’L ASS’N FOR URB.
CLIMATE 2–5, https://www.fs.usda.gov/treesearch/pubs/34270.
186.
See e.g., LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES [LGMA],
UNFCCC Climate Change Conference, https://www.cities-and-regions.org/2017-cop23 (last
visited Dec. 22, 2019).
187.
GROUP OF 20 [G20], What Is the G20?, https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/whatis.aspx
(last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
188.
See id.
189.
Ian Klaus, The Urban 20: A Contemporary Diplomatic History, DIPLOMATIC
COURIER (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/the-urban-20-acontemporary-diplomatic-history.
190.
Id.
191.
Chan, supra note 1, at 151.
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Similarly, and as described briefly above, cities met in Mechelen, Belgium for the Global Conference on Cities and Migration in November 2017
in advance of a December 2017 states-only intergovernmental meeting on
192
the Global Compact on Migration. During the meeting they consolidated
their views on this Compact, came up with a list of recommendations, and
codified them in the Mechelen Declaration, which was then submitted to the
193
state-led event in December in an attempt to influence their discussions.
The Global Compact on Migration adopted one year later, in December of
2018, incorporated elements of the Mechelen Declaration, recommending
state cooperation with “local authorities” to implement and monitor Com194
pact objectives. This shows that state-like city-led events and state-like
but city-crafted documents can and are having very real effects on interna195
tional policymaking.
Cities and city networks not only hold side-events alongside high-level
intergovernmental events in an attempt to shape the contents of international
agreements, but in order to influence their implementation as well. For example, the International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities
(“ICCAR”), a large city network established by UNESCO in 2004, held an
event in Nancy, France while an intergovernmental event to finalize and
adopt the two Global Compacts (on Refugees and on Migration) was held in
196
Morocco. During ICCAR’s event, participating cities adopted the Nancy
Declaration, which confirmed their commitment to upholding the two Global Compacts, but in a way that eliminates opportunities for prejudice and
bigotry by highlighting “the positive and multiple contributions of these
groups [migrants and refugees] to all spheres of life in receiving, transition
197
and origin countries.” It also renewed their pledge to “develop effective
responses to the rise of hate, bigotry and violent extremism,” and recog-

192.
UCLG COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL INCLUSION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, Global Conference on Cities and Migrants, https://www.uclgcisdp.org/en/news/events/global-conference-cities-and-migrants-mechelen (last visited Apr.
12, 2020).
193.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, Global Conference on Cities
and Migration (Nov. 20, 2017), https://belgium.iom.int/news/global-conference-cities-andmigration.
194.
Compare Mechelen Declaration, supra note 139, with G.A. Res. 73/195, Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, ¶¶ 18(c), 19(c), 20, 21(e), 23(k), 24(c),
28(c), 30(e), 32(f), 35(j), 37(i), 39(c), 44, 53 (Dec. 19, 2018) (listing cooperation with local
authorities as a means to realize various compact objectives).
195.
See UCLG, Mayors and Governors Around the World Adopted the Mechelen Declaration on Cities and Migration (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/
mayors-and-governors-around-world-adopted-mechelen-declaration-cities-and-migration.
196.
See MODERN DIPLOMACY, Cities Rally Against Hate, Discrimination, Racism, and
Violent Extremism (Dec. 14, 2018), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/12/14/cities-rallyagainst-hate-discrimination-racism-and-violent-extremism.
197.
UNESCO, ICCAR Global Steering Committee Declaration of Nancy, supra note
125.
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nized the important role that cities and city networks play in implementing
198
UN policies.
City networks are also mirroring regional state-based organizations.
UCLG Africa attempts to mimic many of the things that the African Union
199
would normally be expected to do, while the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which is structured like a traditional congressional body
with two chambers composed of representatives that serve 4-year terms, attempts to perform many of the roles traditionally played by the Council of
200
Europe. By attempting to mirror or mimic these regional organizations,
these city networks are, like many of the examples cited above, not only attempting to advance their own agendas, but to catch the eye of regional
state-based organizations in an effort to shape their policy agendas.
More and more, cities are also engaging in their own international––or
what I would call “global”––relations, separate and autonomous from their
national counterparts. One way they are doing this is by mimicking the actions and structures of their federal governments and setting up their own
offices of international affairs. According to the Nina Hachigian, the first
deputy mayor for international affairs in Los Angeles, cities are increasingly
“global actors in their own right.” Hachigian, a former U.S. Ambassador,
has written about how her work with the city of Los Angeles has been similar to her work as a diplomat for the U.S. government:
I’ve found in my transition to municipal government that I still interact with diplomats all the time, negotiate the texts of agreements,
and attend meetings between heads of state and my principal [in
this case, the mayor of Los Angeles]. The difference is the immediacy of the results, which is gratifying, and the aim to deliver to the
201
people in just a single metropolis.
Los Angeles is not alone in creating an international affairs unit or appointing a lead city diplomat to handle its global engagements. With “the overwhelming majority of cities and states [now] conducting foreign affairs,”
many cities are realizing that they require dedicated staff and specialized
202
offices to carry out this consuming task. According to a recent report on
198.
Id.
199.
UCLG, 8th Africities Summit: Envisioning the Future for the African Region,
https://www.uclg.org/en/taxonomy/term/1620 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); AFRICAN UNION,
What We Do: AU in a Nutshell, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
200.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, A European Assembly of Local and Regional Elected Representatives, https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/overview (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). The
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is made up of two chambers: the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions. The Congress has 324 representatives and 324
substitutes, all appointed for four years, representing over 150,000 local and regional authorities in the Council of Europe’s 47 member states. The Congress’s work is organized within
three committees: a Monitoring Committee, a Governance Committee, and a Current Affairs
Committee. Id.
201.
Hachigian, supra note 2.
202.
See Tavares, supra note 145.
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city diplomacy conducted by leading experts on this topic, “among cities
studied across [] various projects, regardless of size, almost all cities have
some form of governance structure in place to manage engagements with
203
other national or international cities.”
Cities’ offices of international affairs are tasked with engaging in foreign diplomacy with not only their municipal counterparts abroad, but with
national and regional authorities too. Cities in Europe, beginning in the mid
1990s, have been especially active in setting up what have been referred to
204
as “Offices of International Affairs” (“OIAs”). As European cities became
increasingly active in helping the UN to advance its Millennium Development Goals and in the Fair Trade movement, many mayors throughout Europe saw the need to create specialized OIAs to handle the flow of international engagements and work. Today, OIAs tend to be housed
organizationally within the mayor’s office and their portfolios include a
wide variety of tasks, including planning and preparing for inbound and
outbound diplomatic delegations, maintaining ties with partner cities and
international city networks, overseeing and monitoring the progress of international development projects, and sponsoring and organizing cultural
205
and national heritage day events, among many other efforts and projects.
In some cases, cities are codifying their international involvement in
their governing municipal ordinances. When Mexico City decided to assert
its autonomy by adopting its own “Constitution” in 2017, it devoted one of
its crowd-sourced articles to solidifying the city’s commitment to promoting
its presence in the world and among “the global system of cities and local
206
government networks.”

E. Harnessing the Language of International Law
Cities are deploying the language of IL for two reasons and in two different ways. First, they are citing IL as a way to create their own independent platform in the international arena and to gain leverage within the state207
dominated world of international politics. Second, they are using IL to
challenge the actions or inaction of their national governments at the nation208
al level. Both are attempts to act autonomously from their nation-states in
203.
Acuto et al., supra note 135, at 6.
204.
Fishbone, supra note 113, at 4.
205.
Id. at 4–5.
206.
See Mariana Flores, The First Constitution of Mexico City, METROPOLIS (Feb. 21,
2017), https://www.metropolis.org/news/first-constitution-mexico-city; Gregory Scruggs, The
People Power Behind Mexico City’s New Constitution, CITYLAB, (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/the-people-power-behind-mexico-citys-newconstitution/515637.
207.
ASSER INSTITUTE, Cities and International Law in the Urban Age (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.asser.nl/about-the-institute/asser-today/cities-and-international-law-in-the-urbanage.
208.
See generally Moritz Baumgärtel & Barbara Oomen, Pulling Human Rights Back
In? Local Authorities, International Law, and the Reception of Undocumented Migrants, 51 J.

2020]

The Urbanization of International Law

261

order to advance their own policy positions when those positions are at odds
209
with those of their national counterparts. And because IL transcends individual states, it provides cities with a legal foothold to do so. Of course, nation-states, as the legal and political superiors of their sub-national territories (whether under national or international law), have ultimate veto power
210
over the policies and laws adopted by municipalities. But this has not
stopped cities from using IL to gain leverage, as well as the national and international spotlight, for their own policy goals––especially when those
goals conflict with their country’s national goals.
These attempts are especially apparent in recent years in the areas of international environmental law and human rights law, particularly asylum
and refugee law. “Sanctuary cities,” which stake their claim on the international legal right of individuals to seek safe asylum in other countries, and
“human rights cities,” which also situate their legitimacy in international
human rights law, are attempts by cities to overcome the constraints of state
sovereignty and to utilize IL in order to enact their own agendas when those
211
agendas conflict with national policies or laws. In the words of Barbara
Oomen and Mortiz Baumgärtel, two scholars of human rights law in the
context of cities, “local authorities invoke responsibilities derived from international human rights law to ‘decouple’ their policies from those adopted
212
nationally.” Cities oftentimes do this in alliance with NGOs and other affected civil society actors, who together use the power of advocacy, negative publicity, and shaming campaigns to compel states to change their for213
eign policy goals. For example, in the wake of U.S. President George W.
Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq, cities, NGOs, and advocacy groups
came together to denounce the decision, and these denunciations were often
214
framed at least partly in the language of IL.

LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 172, 176 (2019). One example of this is cities’ use of
international human rights law to challenge the migration policies of their national governments and to set up their own more inclusive and welcoming policies, such as through sanctuary cities in the United States. Id.
209.
See generally DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO
THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2012).
210.
See generally Gerald Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW.
553 (1987).
211.
Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 608.
212.
Id. at 614.
213.
Stephen Shergold, When Civil Society Overreaches Regulations, JD SUPRA (Apr.
11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/when-civil-society-overreaches-62070 (arguing that cities and NGOs, working together, “have been holding governments to account in the
courts for non-compliance in relation to climate change and air quality, as well as successfully
driving policy change.”).
214.
See GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Opposition to the War and Occupation of Iraq,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/challenges-to-the-us-empire/opposition-to-the-war-andoccupation-in-iraq-8-37.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (tracking opposition to the war in
Iraq from 2006 to 2011); Los Angeles, Cal., City Council Anti-War Resolution (Feb. 21,
2003).
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This behavior, termed “municipal internationalism,” was also apparent
when U.S. city councils issued resolutions calling for a nuclear weapons
freeze, urging divestment from firms conducting business in South Africa,
opposing the adoption of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and
215
demanding cuts in the Pentagon’s budget.
When President Trump announced in June 2017 that the United States
216
was pulling out of the Paris Agreement, the Mayors of Paris, France, and
217
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania responded with an op-ed in the New York Times.
In it, they announced that “an unprecedented alliance is emerging” among
the more than 7,400 cities worldwide that are committed to upholding the
Paris Agreement’s goals within their own cities, irrespective of their coun218
try’s level of commitment. They explained that cities committed to this
alliance not only for their own citizens, but also for the citizens of “every
219
other city in the world.”
While the cities’ efforts did not cause Trump to reverse his position,
their editorial did put pressure on other U.S. states and cities to adopt similar standards and policies that aligned with, or in some cases were more ambitious than, international environmental law: Though they cannot officially
become signatories, over 400 U.S. cities have pledged to adopt the Paris
220
Climate Agreement into local law or implement it through local practices,
and the number of non-state commitments jumps to above 1,000 when busi221
nesses and federal U.S. states are added into the count.
Municipal activism is not only happening in the United States, but in
cities around the world. The Dutch city of Utrecht, as just one example, often invokes the work of UN Special Rapporteurs and international and regional laws in its efforts to shelter asylum seekers despite a national prohibi222
tion against doing so. Barcelona, like Utrecht, has styled itself a “human

215.
Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 28.
216.
Paris Agreement, Annex A, No. 54113 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://treaties.un.org
/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/54113/Part/I-54113-0800000280458f37.pdf. This is a
pact between 195 states to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.
217.
Anne Hidalgo & William Peduto, The Mayors of Pittsburgh and Paris: We Have
Our Own Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/07/opinion/the-mayors-of-pittsburgh-and-paris-we-have-our-own-climate-deal.html.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
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Climate
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MEDIUM
(June
1,
2017),
https://medium.com/@ClimateMayors/climate-mayors-commit-to-adopt-honor-and-upholdparis-climate-agreement-goals-ba566e260097.
221.
Georgina Gustin, Over 1,400 U.S. Cities, States and Businesses Vow to Meet Paris
Climate Commitments, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 6, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/05062017/paris-climate-agreement-trump-bloomberg-cities-states-businesses.
222.
Barbara Oomen, Cities, Refugees, and Migration, in EDGAR HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CITIES (forthcoming 2020); HUMAN RIGHTS CITY NETWORK,
Human Rights City: Utrecht, https://humanrightscities.net/humanrightscity/utrecht (last visit-
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223

rights city.” It has introduced a human rights policy, appointed a local
human rights ombudsman, created a Human Rights Observatory and two
municipal services tasked with protecting human rights, and adopted a local
224
charter on human rights. Amsterdam has similarly adopted a city-wide
225
human rights agenda rooted in international human rights law, often citing
the latter in order to justify its local policies when those policies conflict
226
with national-level ones. Similarly, mayors throughout Italy and in London have openly stood up to their national counterparts and refused to enact
recent anti-immigration policies, justifying their refusal on the grounds that
to do otherwise would violate the international rights of refugees and mi227
grants.
Cities, both large and small, are also codifying treaties, wholesale and
228
in part, into local law. Many mayors throughout the United States adopted
the Paris Climate Agreement––or some version of it––into local legislation
ed Apr. 12, 2020); HumanRightsUtrecht.nl (city of Utrecht’s human rights website) (in Dutch)
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
223.
UCLG Comm. on Soc. Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Hum. Rts., Building the ‘City of Rights’: The Human Rights Policy of Barcelona (1995), https://www.uclgcisdp.org/en/observatory/building-%E2%80%98city-rights%E2%80%99-human-rightspolicy-barcelona.
224.
Id. The policy implements human rights locally and aims to turn Barcelona into a
“city of rights.” Both international human rights and the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City (“ECHRC”) provide the human rights language and framework of the policy. Funding for the policy comes from the municipal budget. Although the
objective of becoming a city of rights arguably concerns the entire local government, the main
institution concerned with implementation is the Civil Rights Department (“RDC”) of the
municipality, within which different bodies operate: (1) the Office for Non-Discrimination,
which mainly processes complaints of discrimination through mediation; (2) the Office for
Religious Affairs, which promotes the religious freedom of the city’s religious communities in
their relationship with the local administration and population; (3) the Council for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender people, which is an advisory body composed of NGOs, collectives, and other informal groups concerned with LGBT issues (though, recently, a plan for the
mainstreaming of LGBT rights has also been promoted by the RDC); and (4) the Human
Rights Observatory, which checks the status of human rights in the city. In addition to the
RDC, the Síndic(a) de Greuges de Barcelona (the city’s ombudsperson) performs audits on the
local administration that, especially considering the independent status of this institution, provide a crucial support to the safeguarding of human rights at the city level.
225.
CITY OF AMSTERDAM, Policy: Diversity, https://www.amsterdam.nl/en/policy
/policy-diversity (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (discussing Amsterdam’s “human rights policy”).
226.
See Anna Plyushteva, The Right to the City and Struggles over Urban Citizenship:
Exploring the Links, AMSTERDAM SOC. SCI., 2009, at 81–97.
227.
Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 608 (discussing London’s adoption of a
municipal identification program for undocumented immigrants at part of their #LondonIsOpen campaign); Chiara Giordano, Italian Mayors Rebel Against Salvini’s Laws Cracking Down on Asylum Seekers, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/italy-immigration-matteo-salvini-laws-asylum-seekers-mayorsa8711051.html.
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Two examples of cities adopting entire treaties into law are San Francisco and Los
Angeles adopting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women [CEDAW]. See infra notes 230–231.
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after President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the agreement. Before that, in 2005, nearly 150 cities––representing almost thirty
million residents––signed on to the Kyoto Protocol after President Bush re229
230
fused to do so. Similarly, the mayors of San Francisco (in 1998) and,
231
many years later, Los Angeles (in 2015) adopted the UN Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women into municipal law, despite the United States’ ongoing refusal to ratify it at the national
232
level. In Europe, a variety of cities symbolically “ratified” the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and codified parts
of it into local law, long before many of their national governments fol233
lowed suit.
City networks also harness the language of IL in order to advance their
own, separate goals. For example, Eurocities, a network of major European
cities founded in 1986, issued a statement in 2015 on “Asylum in Cities” in
the wake of an influx of refugees from parts of the Middle East into Eu234
rope. In this statement, they cite refugees’ “right to seek international protection,” as codified under “European treaties and international law,” to
support their efforts to provide safe haven to refugees through “Solidarity
235
Cities.” The European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, an international city network launched in 2004 that now includes over 120 municipalities
from twenty-four different European countries, bases its advocacy and policy work on the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
236
Racial Discrimination.
Cities’ efforts to wield the language of international law appear to be
paying off, or, at least, catching the ear of those in the international policyand law-making world. The UN Human Rights Council, for example, has
noted that local governments have a shared responsibility and a mutually
complementary role in the domestic implementation of international human
rights norms and standards, and it has called for additional research on local
229.
Paul Brown, US Cities Snub Bush and Sign Up to Kyoto, GUARDIAN (May 16,
2005), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/may/17/usnews.climatechange.
230.
San Francisco, Cal., CEDAW Ordinance (1998).
231.
Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 175735 (Dec. 30, 2003) (providing for the local implementation of CEDAW).
232.
UN Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (showing CEDAW ratification;
the United States has not yet ratified CEDAW).
233.
Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 617.
234.
EUROCITIES, Statement on Asylum in Cities (May 2015), http://nws.eurocities.eu/
MediaShell/media/EUROCITIES%20stmt_asylum_May%202015.pdf.
235.
Id. at 1–2.
236.
EUROPEAN COALITION OF CITIES AGAINST RACISM [ECCAR], General Information,
https://www.eccar.info/sites/default/files/document/ECCAR_basic%20information
%202_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); ECCAR, List of the Member Cities of ECCAR,
https://www.eccar.info/en/members (last visited Jan 13, 2020). ECCAR was not the independent creation of cities but was launched instead by UNESCO; it is supported by the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights and UCLG. See ECCAR, General Information.
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237

governments and human rights. Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, whose office is responsible for refugees, invited cities to join the
#WithRefugees campaign, thereby highlighting and strengthening the role
238
of cities in protecting and housing refugees.

F. Adopting and Implementing “Global Law”
Cities and city networks are not just using the verbiage of IL; they are
adopting joint statements, declarations, covenants, commitments, and action
and policy plans that look and act strikingly similar to international legal
agreements. Like other forms of “global law” these instruments are rooted
in the consent of the signatory. And just like other global agreements, they
are typically valid only with signature by officially authorized individuals
(often mayors or top city officials, like those in the city’s OIA), an official
deposit of the signed agreement with a specially designated agency or authority (typically the agreement’s sponsor), and some form of monitoring
and reporting, albeit often in the form of self-monitoring and self-reporting.
As in much of public IL, which in many instances is enforced through
239
shaming or pressure campaigns rather than typical enforcement measures,
the agreements typically lack robust enforcement mechanisms (such as
sanctions in the event of a violation).
These law-like and legally influential documents are increasingly common and increasingly impactful. For example, the Global Covenant of
Mayors for Climate and Energy is an international alliance of cities and local governments with a shared long-term vision of promoting and support240
ing voluntary action to combat climate change. In its efforts to mobilize
cities and local governments to be active contributors to a global climate solution, it encourages cities to make “strategic action plans” that are registered, implemented, made publicly available, and monitored by the Cove241
nant’s secretariat. Through its efforts, the Global Covenant of Mayors has
received the commitment of over 9,000 cities and local governments from
six continents and 127 countries, representing more than 770 million residents. The commitment process, which all “signatory cities” must under242
go, in many ways mirrors the treaty-signing process performed by nationstates. Cities or local governments wishing to formalize their commitment
237.
Rep. of the Advisory Comm. to the Hum. Rts. Council on Its Ninth Session, at 18,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/AC/9/6 (August 14, 2012); ECCAR, General Information, supra note 236.
238.
UNHCR, Cities #WithRefugees, https://www.unhcr.org/withrefugees/cities (last
visited Jan. 13, 2020).
239.
Frederic Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, (Jan. 22, 1996),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law.
240.
THE GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, About Us,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
241.
Id.
242.
THE GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, How to Join the
Global Covenant of Mayors, https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/participate (last visited
Jan. 13, 2020).
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with the Global Covenant of Mayors must submit a commitment document
signed by a government official according to their local governmental pro243
cedures. Once submitted, cities are called on to “develop a greenhouse
gas emissions inventory,” adopt a “full climate action plan,” define “ambi244
tious climate mitigation targets,” and regularly report on their progress.
Similarly, C40 has crafted a number of “pacts” and “declarations” that
its members can choose to accept a la carte. Once accepted, however, these
agreements are treated as formal commitments and require regular reporting
and monitoring. For example, C40’s Green and Healthy Street Declaration
commits its signatories to procure only zero-emission buses by 2025 and to
ensure that a major portion of their cities are entirely emission-free by
245
2030. Signatories must fill out a “planned action template” and submit it
246
to the C40 Secretariat for formal recording. The full list of committed cities and their specific action plans are then published online in an effort to
247
hold them publicly accountable. C40’s Advancing Towards Zero Waste
Declaration is another example of a global law generated and overseen by a
248
city network. This declaration obligates cities and regions to cut the
amount of waste generated by each of their citizens by 15% by 2030. Signatory cities must “publicly report” on their progress every two years, submit
a planned action template to C40’s secretariat, and agree to have their
249
names published online in order to be held publicly accountable. To date,
250
twenty-eight cities and regions have signed on.
As hinted above, at times city networks join forces to create and implement global laws. The One Planet Charter, for example, is a joint initiative of C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors, and ICLEI that commits signatory cities to enact specific climate action policies accelerating
251
implementation of the Paris Agreement. Commitments must be registered
with the Global Covenant of Mayor’s Secretariat, a list of “committed cities” is made publicly available, and cities with particularly ambitious “city

243.
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other_uploads/images/1924_FFF_ACTION_010219.original.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
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CITIES,
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THE GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, Join the One
Planet Charter and Let’s Set Up Climate Action in 2018! (June 12, 2018),
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climate actions” are featured on their website. To date, over 800 cities
253
have signed the charter.
In other cases, global laws are conceived of by individual mayors. The
“Urban Food Policy Pact,” for example, was launched by the Mayor of Milan, Italy in February 2014 and signed by 100 cities. This pact “commits”
signatories to build and establish food systems centered on sustainability
and social justice. After the pact was signed by all 100 cities, it was deposited with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, following the same protocol
254
as international treaty adoptions and ratifications.
Other global laws include the World Green Building Council’s Net Ze255
ro Carbon Building Commitment, which obligates signatories to follow a
five-stage process to ensure that all of their buildings, whether old or new,
meet net-zero carbon standards by 2050, and the European Charter for Safeguarding Human Rights in the Cities, which has now been signed by over
256
400 cities. Moreover, many of the agreements and pacts previously mentioned throughout this article, such as the Nancy Declaration, the Mechelen
Declaration, and the Shanghai Declaration, as well as others not here mentioned like the Climate Mayor’s Pledge, could also be included in this growing list. And finally, legal documents signed between international organizations and international city networks, such as the memorandum of
understanding recently signed by the Global Parliament of Mayors
257
(“GPM”) and UN-Habitat to formalize the GPM’s implementation of the
258
SDGs at the local level, could also be placed in the growing body of legallike instruments being signed and implemented by mayors around the

252.
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257.
The Global Parliament of Mayors (“GPM”) is an international city network created
in 2016 and conceived of by best-selling author and scholar Benjamin Barber in the final
chapter of his book If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities. The
GPM aims to represent and amplify the opinions of mayors and cities at the international law.
BARBER, supra note 21. It has the goal of informing international policies on issues of local
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[GPM], UN Habitat and Mannheim Work Towards Accreditation of GPM,
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259

world. The GPM contributes to global policy discussions, in part, through
its virtual voting platform, which allows participating mayors to vote on
specific policy outcomes from wherever they might be in the world, which
260
can then be delivered to policy-makers at the international level. According to the GPM, this represents “an excellent example of adapting the inter261
national agenda through local action.”
In some cases, global laws involve a variety of non-state actors, including private organizations and foundations in addition to international organizations and cities. For example, in March 2016, mayors from around the
world signed on to the New York Proposal for Inclusive Growth in Cities as
262
a symbol of their commitment to address rising inequality. By signing on
to the proposal, all of the signatory mayors agreed to champion an “inclusive growth agenda” in their cities, to share best practices, and to help shape
263
a policy roadmap to achieve more inclusive growth in cities worldwide.
Of course, challenges arise with respect to these softer, non-binding
forms of “law.” At root, all are voluntary and unenforceable, and therefore
rely on the power of persuasion, reputation, and self-reporting. Moreover,
verification is often difficult, and standards are often amorphous. For example, in the “frequently asked questions” section of C40’s pledge “to deliver
inclusive climate action that benefits all citizens equitably,” C40 concedes
that “standardization of outcomes is unlikely to be possible” and that “inclusive climate action” will be different in different cities and regions, making
264
any formal way to track or report violations difficult at best. Mayors are
encouraged to define inclusivity in the way that is most suitable to their particular geographical, social and economic contexts. Yet, these agreements
are still law, and legally influential and impactful. What is needed is a new
vocabulary, a new conceptual framework, indeed a whole new way of conceptualizing the changing role of cities within international politics. Our
current terminology and our current framework are ill equipped to accurately and holistically understand the increasingly influential roles that cities are
now playing both on the national and international political stages. A tentative attempt to offer a new vocabulary and conceptual lens to better under259.
UNITED NATIONS, Goal 11: Make Cities Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
260.
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261.
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United Way Worldwide. Id.
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stand the changing status of cities at the global level, which I hope that future scholarship and researchers will deepen and build upon, is presented
below.

IV. The Urbanization of Global Relations and Global Law
Although the literature in this field is outdated and empirically and conceptually wanting in certain respects, it nevertheless points to a reality: Cities’ influence, assertiveness, and ability to shape outcomes at the international level (their “soft power”) has been escalating since shortly after the
turn of the twenty-first century. This is true despite the fact that cities no
longer have militaries or full sovereignty, and they do not harbor the traditional hard power tools embodied by states. Yet they do have power in some
senses: the ability to exercise influence over others, and more specifically,
the ability to get other actors to do something that they otherwise would not
265
do. Cities influence the actions of others––whether other cities or city
networks, civil society organizations, international organizations, private
businesses, or states––throughout the globe.
Cities’ power is reflected in their ability to attract people, money, and
goods from around the globe. Cities might not have powerful weaponry, but
they (at least global and mega-cities) have powerful brands, extraordinary
wealth, incredible diversity, and the most cutting-edge innovations, infrastructure, and technology. Moreover, they have the trust of their residents,
the ability to mobilize collectively, and a democratic legitimacy often lack266
ing in nation-states. They are operating globally, signing and implementing things that look and act like international law, forming powerful partnerships, and influencing the actions and policy positions of other international
actors, including nation-states.
Yet, if one were to examine black letter IL or an IR textbook, it would
be easy to conclude that cities are entirely absent from the international political arena. While cities are taking on greater, more visible, and more influential roles in international affairs, they remain largely powerless under
IL, which continues to prioritize states as the primary possessors of rights
and duties. The little scholarship that exists on this topic––notably including
the body of literature known as “international local government law”––
includes many insights and valuable contributions, but tries to pigeon hole
cities into the constrained parameters and vocabulary of IL and IR, neither
of which––and especially not IL––easily map onto cities and their changing
status in international politics. By mixing up norms, laws, influence, persuasion, and coercion, this literature conflates two distinctions that, when crisply applied to cities, can more usefully describe their current position the international arena. The first distinction, which receives scrutiny from IR

265.
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The second, which is studied by IL

A. Cities’ Rising Soft Power
Soft power is the ability to achieve objectives, oftentimes foreign policy
269
objectives, through attraction and persuasion. Put another way, it is the
ability to influence the actions of others without force or coercion. In the
current globalized and digitized era, where power is more diffuse and our
common challenges are more interdependent, “victory often depends not on
270
whose army wins, but on whose story wins.” More and more actors, including non-state actors, are asserting themselves in national and global politics, which are no longer the exclusive terrain of nation-states. Joseph Nye,
who first coined the term “soft power” in 1990, applied this term, like most
271
political scientists, only to states. Yet, soft power is equally applicable to
other non-state actors, including cities, and can help to explain their rising
influence. Indeed, the things that Nye identifies as comprising a nation’s
soft power––favorability toward foreign countries, foreigners, and tourists;
higher education institutions, embassies, museums, and cultural organizations; technological and digital sophistication; access to creative industries
and entertainment; and the ability to facilitate foreign exchanges, among
272
others––are almost always found in local-level policies. The same things
that give nation-states increased soft power give cities increased soft power,
and, in many instances these days, cities, rather than states, seem to be the
leaders in acquiring and increasing this type of power.
One of the primary ways that cities have acquired and increased their
soft power is by forming the city networks described above. When Blank
wrote about the rise of “global associations of localities” in 2006, he could
273
list only nine examples. Today, well over 200 such networks exist and this
number is continually rising, with an average of four new international city
274
networks emerging every year. Similarly, when Blank, Frug, and Barron
wrote their articles on cities and IL in the early 2000s, examples of the ways
in which cities were adopting and enforcing international norms and acting
267.
See generally JOSEPH NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2004).
268.
See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).
269.
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POWER 12 (2018), https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Soft-Power-30Report-2018.pdf.
270.
Joseph Nye, The Information Revolution and Soft Power, 113 CURRENT HISTORY
19, 20 (2014) (citing John Arquilla).
271.
See JOSEPH NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN
POWER (1990).
272.
MCCLORY, supra note 269, at 31–33.
273.
Blank, supra note 26, at 922–23.
274.
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as independent global actors were admittedly “hard to pinpoint.” But today, nearly fifteen years later, this is no longer the case. Examples of the
ways in which cities are helping to advance certain international norms and
acting as autonomous global actors now abound.

B. Cities’ Use of Soft Law
Soft law describes those quasi-legal instruments that are neither strictly
binding nor completely lacking in legal significance, such as declarations,
guidelines, protocols, principles, policy declarations, codes of conduct,
276
communications, and the like. They are not enforceable in the traditional
ways, but nevertheless have an impact and influence over state, or in this
277
case, city, behavior. UN General Assembly Resolutions are a classic example of international soft law (as made by nation-states); they are legally
significant and can and often do influence state behavior, but they are not
278
legally binding or enforceable in a court of law. In contrast, hard law, in
the international context, includes binding legal agreements, with the classic
279
example being an international treaty, the primary source of IL.
Hard law creates responsibilities and rights that are legally enforceable
by authorized courts or tribunals, backed by a police or military force, and
that impose real consequences (typically including fines, imprisonment, or
280
obligatory corrective action). Soft law, on the other hand, creates nonenforceable standards and norms and relies on the force of persuasion, reputation, and cooption (the same mechanisms through which soft power is ex281
ercised) to induce voluntary compliance. Though soft law is often thought
to be “vague,” “uncompelling,” and “weak,” the powerful fact remains: It is
282
often followed. According to a leading IL textbook, “states do in fact respect and rely on ‘soft law’ norms,” just as they comply with many hard law
283
norms even when they know that enforcement is extremely unlikely. In
many cases, and especially at the international level, soft law norms transform or crystallize into hard law; this is how much of customary international law is formed. Much of international environmental law, for example,
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started out as ‘soft law’ norms, but, as time went on, global actors decided
to embody those norms in formal international treaties, such as the Paris
284
Climate Agreement.
285
The hard versus soft law dichotomy, when combined with the hard
versus soft law distinction, can help to explain the rise of cities internationally in recent years despite their ongoing powerlessness from a formal international legal and political perspective. Hard and soft power are disconnected; one can exist without the other. For example, while North Korea’s hard
power is high, it is lacking entirely in soft power, or the ability to change
other states’ behavior through attraction to its values or policy objectives.
Similarly, while America has traditionally been strong on both soft and hard
power, some (including Joseph Nye himself) argue that in the Trump era, its
286
soft power has plummeted. While cities remain powerless from a hard
power and hard law perspective, they have increasingly high levels of soft
power, which they are using, in part, to adopt soft law instruments.
And having one increases the other. As cities’ soft power rises, the
number of soft law instruments they wield also rises. Cities’ rising soft
power and increasing use of soft law are demonstrated by their formidable
role in a variety of multilateral agendas, events, committees and taskforces–
287
–including the UN’s New Urban Agenda; the two Earth Summits in 1992
288
and 2002; the UN Habitat conference in 1996 and every subsequent Habitat conference since; the annual Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migra289
tion, and Development; the World Assembly of Local and Regional Gov290
291
ernments; the Cities #WithRefugees Campaign; the World Human
292
293
Rights Cities Forum; Local Agenda 21; the UN Global Taskforce on

284.
Id.
285.
Note that this distinction is contested by some scholars. Legal positivists tend to
deny the very concept of “soft” law since law, by definition, is “binding” in their view. For
example, Jan Klabbers, a legal positivist, contends that law cannot be “more or less binding”
and that the concept of soft law is logically flawed. See Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft
Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 168–81 (1996) (advocating against retention of the “traditional binary conception of law”). Professor Prosper Weil makes a slightly different argument
when he claims that the proliferation of “soft law” weakens the international legal system by
blurring the line between law and nonlaw. See Weil, supra note 282, at 414–15.
286.
Joseph Nye, Donald Trump and the Decline of US Soft Power, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-americansoft-power-decline-by-joseph-s—nye-2018-02.
287.
Supra note 149.
288.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1992); World
Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF/199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002).
289.
Supra note 173.
290.
Supra text accompanying notes 158–161.
291.
Supra note 238.
292.
The World Human Rights Cities Forum takes place annually. See UCLG, The
World Human Rights Cities Forum (WHRCF) of Gwangju, South Korea, https://www.uclg-

2020]

The Urbanization of International Law
294

273

295

Local and Regional Governments; and UNACLA. Their rising soft
power is also reflected in the multitude of legal-like agreements signed between cities and international organizations, or among globally dispersed
296
cities themselves; examples include the Climate Energy Declaration; the
297
Mechelen Declaration on Cities and Migration; the Aberdeen Agenda
298
Principles on Good Practice for Local Democracy and Good Governance;
299
the Global Compact on Refugees; Goal 11 of the Sustainable Develop300
301
ment Goals; and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

C. Updating Core IL and IR Terminology
The international arena is no longer the exclusive playground of nationstates, but instead is a crowded arena buzzing with a variety of non-state actors, some of which are governmental, some of which are private, and some
of which defy both those categories. This arena can no longer accurately be
characterized as “international,” or as governed by “international” law and
the rules of “international” relations. The broader and more inclusive term
global is much more accurate and appropriate. According to Janne Nijman,
“we are facing a moment of foreign policy transformation: We are shifting
from an international to a global society and in this process the city is rising
302
as a key foreign policy actor.” Global society, global governance, global
relations, global law, global actors, global cities: These are the terms that
make up the terminology of the twenty-first century. To remain aligned with
cisdp.org/en/activities/human-rights-cities/international-meetings/World-Human-RightsCities-Forum-of-Gwangju (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
293.
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empirical realities, international lawyers and scholars of IR should start incorporating these terms into their vocabulary. Failure to do so will result in
confusing conclusions like Frug and Barron’s statement that cities’ role in
international politics is best characterized as a “combination of simultane303
ous empowerment and disempowerment.”
This struggle with language is reflected in the emerging literature on
city diplomacy as well, which refers to cities’ involvement in global politics
as “Municipal Internationalism,” “Paradiplomacy,” the “International Mu304
nicipal Movement,” and the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” among oth305
ers. The emerging body of literature, which includes the current article, on
city diplomacy fills in the gaps and provides the necessary updates where
the “international local government law” literature leaves off. However,
while interdisciplinary, analytically rigorous, and empirically rich, this newer body of research is largely not led by legal scholars, and it does not include any legal analysis. Instead, it falls at the intersection of urban planning
and IR, neither of which tend to prioritize (and both of which often downplay or ignore), the legal dimensions of recent global urbanization trends.
As such, while the city diplomacy literature lacks the legal analysis and insights characteristic of the earlier international local government law literature, the latter lacks the more up-to-date and empirically rigorous nature of
the former. Together, however, these two bodies of literature––especially
when combined with the legal literature on soft law and the political science
literature on soft power,––present a much fuller and more robust portrayal
of the status of cities in global governance today.
I call the nexus of these two fields “the urbanization of global relations.” Building on the various bodies of applicable research that exist on
cities, I propose a research agenda for this new field that encompasses the
literature on global governance, city diplomacy, and city networking; international local government law; IL scholarship on soft versus hard law; and
IR scholarship on soft versus hard power. To more fully develop this research agenda, the collective and interdisciplinary efforts of international
lawyers, as well as scholars of IR, IL, and cities, will all be necessary. Only
by reaching across our departmental aisles, interbreeding our ideas, and
working collaboratively together can we fully understand the complex geolegal-political landscape that now defines international governance.
Under our current conceptual framework––a world order built on the
idea that nation-states are the sole international actors that matter, and that

303.
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304.
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hard power and hard law are the primary determinants of international influence––cities appear formally powerless. Yet, when new concepts are embraced and new terminology employed, the status of cities looks entirely
different.
Cities embody increased levels of soft power, which they’ve acquired in
part by increasing their arsenal of soft law tools. They are forming into
powerful large-scale networks, allying with well-connected international organizations, gaining seats on UN decision-making bodies, successfully lobbying for inclusion in multilateral agendas, mirroring state-based coalitions
and events, and adopting their own body of global laws, which they use to
hold each other accountable. They are participating in global, not international, politics, alongside an array of other non-state actors, and their voices,
opinions, and needs are being heard. It is time to break out of the “conceptual jail” that IL and IR have imprisoned cities within, and to see global (not
international) politics for what it is: a fuzzy and complex domain of states
and non-state actors cooperating and competing together to shape global
(not international) policies and to participate in global (not international)
306
governance.

V. Conclusion
Cities are central to all current and projected global challenges and their
centrality translates into increased assertiveness and influence at the global
307
level. Today, cities––not nation-states––are where the global wealth,
global population, global trade, global innovations, and our great global
threats can all be found; they produce over 80% of global GDP, release 75%
of planet-warming emissions, and house 54% of the human population (and
308
rising). An increasing number of cities, like Tokyo and London, now
309
boast economies larger than many G-20 countries. New York City’s GDP
is larger than that of Spain or South Korea; Sao Paulo is wealthier than Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia combined; and Guangdong in Chi-
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310

na is richer than either Russia or Mexico. Despite occupying less than 3%
of the earth’s surface, the majority (and soon the vast majority) of the
world’s population, including nearly all refugees and migrants, reside in the
world’s geographically miniscule urban areas. By 2050, nearly 70% of all
311
people will live in cities, and by 2030 there will be over forty mega312
cities. Given these startling statistics, it is no wonder that some are refer313
ring to the current era as the “age of urbanization,” the “century of cit314
315
ies,” and the “urban millennium.” A “Localist Revolution,” as it’s also
been described, is indeed underway, and this revolution is metamorphosing
our global institutions of governance and law in unprecedented new ways.
Consequently, we need a new way of thinking and talking about our global–
316
–no longer international––relations.
As legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter declared nearly fifteen years
317
ago, and as iconic city scholar Benjamin Barber confirmed more recently,
a “new world order,” is emerging in which non-state actors, including subnational actors, are taking on more influential and assertive roles on the
318
world stage. The nation-state, according to Slaughter, Barber, and now
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others, has begun to disaggregate into sub-component parts, which are now
rising up, pushing ahead, and in many cases, leaping over the world’s historic Leviathans, to join forces with other non-state actors and stake out
319
their own policy positions at the global level. Among these new actors are
local governments, the so-called “invisible gorillas of international stud320
ies,” which play an “essential role in developing and implementing ac321
tions and driving ambition,” and where, according to certain international
322
experts, the “future of humanity” lies. Some have even gone so far as to
claim that cities are taking the lead and even supplanting national governments when it comes to solving our critical twenty-first century global chal323
lenges. That claim that has increased resonance in an era when states
seem increasingly incapable of reaching an agreement on some of our most
basic and glaring challenges, such as climate change. As former Mayor and
Chair of the C40, Michael Bloomberg, famously tweeted in 2013, “while
324
nations talk, cities act.” Even the UN itself, the primary international organization overseeing global governance, conceded shortly after the turn of
325
the twenty-first century that “humanity’s future is decidedly urban.”
While we tend to focus on globalization and digitization as the key trends of
the twenty-first century, those trends are primarily realized through the
overarching trend of our times: urbanization.
New concepts, paradigms, and conceptual frameworks are needed to
understand this new reality. Old terms, such as international relations, international law, international organizations, which carry the word “nation”
within them are starting to sound out-of-touch and anachronistic in an era
when global governance involves a multitude of actors involved in a variety
of activities traditionally performed only by states. The concepts of soft law,
soft power, global law, and global relations, while just a start, will put us on
the path of better understanding how cities can remain both formally powerFrug and Barron, “cities are involved in the very kinds of networks that Slaughter describes.”
Id. at 24.
319.
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less under the current international legal regime, yet informally influential,
and increasingly so, in a global political arena defined by a diffusion of ac326
tors and power. Cities, through their use of soft law instruments, savvy
strategies, and influential alliances, are acquiring more and more soft power
in the global sphere, allowing them to contribute not only to the implementation and enforcement of global agendas and IL, but also to contribute to
their very formation.
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